Critical perspectives on the Motor Industry Development Programme as a post-apartheid industrial policy instrument by Nkunzi, Sibulele
1 
 
Critical Perspectives on the Motor Industry 
Development Programme as a Post-Apartheid 
Industrial Policy Instrument 
 
By 
 
SIBULELE NKUNZI 
 
Student No. 319515 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree 
 
Master of Commerce in Development Theory 
and Policy 
 
In the Faculty of Commerce, Law and 
Management 
 
at the 
 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Nicolas Pons-Vignon 
 
March 2014 
Protocol Number: CECON/1020 
 
 
2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                                                                        
DECLARATION...................................................................................................................... 4 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. 5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................... 6 
ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS .................................................................................. 7 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 10 
       1.1 BACKGROUND    ..................................................................................................... 11 
       1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM  ........................................................................................... 12 
       1.3 HYPOTHESIS  ........................................................................................................... 14 
       1.4 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES .................................................................. 14 
       1.5 METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 14 
       1.6 OUTLINE OF STUDY  .............................................................................................. 15 
CHAPTER 2: THEORETCICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW: 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY  ....................................................................................................... 17 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 18 
2.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INDUSTRIAL POLICY.................................... 18 
        2.2.1 Neoclassical theory ................................................................................................. 18 
        2.2.2 Structuralist theory .................................................................................................. 20 
2.3 A STRUCTURALIST CASE FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY  .......................................... 22 
        2.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 22 
        2.3.2 Infant industry protection ........................................................................................ 24 
        2.3.3 Learning rents ......................................................................................................... 25 
        2.3.4 Reciprocal control mechanisms .............................................................................. 26 
        2.3.5 State capacity  ......................................................................................................... 28 
2.4 A PROBLEMITIZATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIC 
POLICY ................................................................................................................................... 29 
        2.4.1Apartheid Industrialization ...................................................................................... 29 
        2..4.2 Post-Apartheid Industrialization ............................................................................ 31 
        2.4.3 The National Industrial Policy Framework and the Industrial Policy Action Plan 32 
2.5 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN EAST ASIAN 
NICs VIS-À-VIS SOUTH AFRICA ........................................................................................ 33 
CHAPTER 3: THE GLOBAL AND SOUTH AFRICAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES
.................................................................................................................................................. 35 
3.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY .............................. 36 
3 
 
3.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY .................................................. 38 
        3.2.1 A Historical Overview ............................................................................................ 38 
3.3 THE MIDP ......................................................................................................................... 39 
        3.3.1 Instruments of the MIDP ........................................................................................ 41 
                 3.3.1.1 Import duty rates ......................................................................................... 41 
                 3.3.1.2 The Duty Free Allowance  .......................................................................... 42 
                 3.3.1.3 The Small Vehicle Incentive ....................................................................... 42 
                3.3.1.4 Import-Export Complementation Scheme  .................................................. 43 
                3.3.1.5 The Productive Asset Allowance ................................................................. 43 
CHAPTER 4 : EMPRICAL STUDY – RESULTS AND ANALYSIS .............................. 45 
4.1 PERFORMANCE TRENDS OF KEY INDUSTRY VARIABLES AGAINST MIDP 
OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................................... 46 
         4.1.1 Employment ........................................................................................................... 46 
         4.1.2 Investment .............................................................................................................. 47 
         4.1.3 Rationalization ....................................................................................................... 48 
         4.1.4 Trade Balance ........................................................................................................ 49 
         4.1.5 Vehicle Affordability . ........................................................................................... 49 
4.2 GOVERNANCE OF THE MIDP ...................................................................................... 52 
4.3 RECIPROCAL CONTROL MECHANISMS IN MIDP ................................................... 57 
4.4 STATE CAPACITY AND THE MIDP ............................................................................. 62 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS ................................................. 66 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 71 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1 World Rankings – Vehicle Production 2013  .......................................................... 37 
Table 3.2 Global production of vehicles .................................................................................. 38 
Table 3.3 Key policy instruments of MIDP-APDP ................................................................. 41 
Table 3.4 MIDP Tariff Rates (%)  ........................................................................................... 42 
Table 3.5 The Duty Free Allowance ........................................................................................ 42 
Table 4.1 Employment trends in the South African Automotive Industry: 1990-2012 ........... 50 
Table 4.2 New Investment/Capital Expenditure 2000-2012 .................................................... 51 
Table 4.3 Automotive Industry Trade Balance 1995-2012 ..................................................... 51 
 
4 
 
DECLARATION 
I declare that the work submitted is my own unaided work. This research work has not been 
submitted anywhere else for any degree and all sources have been acknowledged. 
Name: 
Signature:  
Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
ABSTRACT 
The South African automotive industry, which for a long period was inward-looking and 
isolated from the global environment, is now fully integrated into the global automotive 
industry. Between 1995 and 2012, the government subsidised the South African automotive 
industry with the aim of building its global competitiveness through the Motor Industry 
Development Programme (MIDP). The Purpose of this study was to critically evaluate the 
MIDP as an industrial policy instrument to enhance the global competiveness of the South 
African automotive industry. A knowledge base in the form of a theoretical framework was 
created, focusing on the neoclassical vis-à-vis the structuralist understanding of industrial 
policy and the role of the state in development. This was followed by a literature review 
which problematized the industrial and economic policies that have shaped the path of 
industrialisation in South Africa, as well as their subtle influences on the automotive industry 
policy. An overview of the MIDP and its instruments as well as the critical evaluation of the 
performance of MIDP against its objectives was done.  
The study shows the results have been particularly disappointing with respect to employment, 
the development of domestic supplier industries and the attraction of manufacturing 
capabilities and competencies linked to learning. The findings suggest that limitations of 
government enforcement of reciprocal control mechanisms (RCMs) on original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs); the state-labour-industry institutional arrangements in the policy 
process; as well as the subtle influences of neoliberal policies and weak governmental 
capacities at the Department of Trade and Industry, explain the disappointing results of the 
MIDP.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The history of the South African automotive industry begins in the 1920s, with the 
government of the time implementing high tariffs and local content requirements to protect 
the domestic automotive sector (Black, 2001). This import substitution type of strategy 
resulted in an inwardly-oriented motor industry with a wide range of models and small 
volumes of production and low economies of scale (Black and Mitchell, 2002). This 
continued up until 1961 when a more focused strategy of intervention was introduced with a 
series of local content programmes which would run up-until 1995. These interventions failed 
to improve economies of scale and to streamline production towards fewer models 
(Bronkhorst, Steyn and Stiglingh 2013). The shift towards an export-oriented strategy for the 
automotive industry started in 1989 but became more pronounced in 1995 with the 
introduction of the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) (Black, 2001). The 
MIDP was introduced at a time where South Africa had embraced Washington Consensus 
type policies and was moving in the direction of trade-liberalisation through the promotion of 
exports and relaxation of key industrial policy instruments such as tariffs in its economic 
sectors, including the automotive industry (Edwards, 2005). The government was faced with 
the challenge of striking a balance between maintaining support towards this industry so that 
it would achieve global competitiveness, whilst at the same time complying with the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organisation rules (Damoense 
and Simon, 2004). The government opted to reduce MIDP tariffs more aggressively than 
WTO requirements (Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn, 2007).  
The objectives of the MIDP were to promote competiveness, encourage exports, improve the 
trade balance for the automotive industry, stabilise employment and ensure vehicle 
affordability (DTI, 2003). The MIDP was initially planned to last till 2002, but was twice 
extended, firstly till 2007 and the second time till 2012 when the programme came to an end 
(Black, 2002; Black, 2003; Barnes and Morris, 2008). The success of the MIDP in achieving 
growth in exports is uncontested (Black, 2002; AIEC, 2013) however, other objectives there 
is much debate on whether the MIDP has been successful in meeting other key objectives 
(Flatters, 2005; Bronkhorst, Steyn and Stiglingh 2013).The Automotive Production 
Development Programme was introduced in 2013 as an extension to MIDP (Bronkhorst, 
Steyn and Stiglingh, 2013). The intention of the APDP is to promote production instead of 
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being an incentive that promotes exports as this is inconsistent with the WTO, as well as to 
align the support for this sector to the structural analysis of the economy and objectives of the 
National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) (Creamer, 2008).  
The questionable success story of the South African automotive industry and its previous 
policy the MIDP unfolds against the successful state intervention and industrial policy in the 
East Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs), which open a window of insight to the 
critical success factors that differentiate their outstanding performance of their automotive 
industries (Jenkins, 1995).  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Despite being subsidized for a number of years, the  South African automotive industy has 
fared badly in comparison to other developing country industries such as India and China 
(Bronkhorst, Steyn and Stiglingh, 2013). Subsidisation of the automotive industry in South 
Africa has remained a controversial matter. Several studies (Black, 2001; Black, 2002; 
Flatters, 2005; Barnes, et al., 2003; Black & Bhanisi, 2007; Flatters & Netshitomboni, 2006) 
have been done of the performance of the MIDP. However, they all reach different 
conclusions on the extent that MIDP has been successful in achieving its objectives. The 
Government Communication and Information System (GCIS, 2008 in Bronkhorst, Steyn and 
Stiglingh, 2013) reported that it would be difficult for the South African automotive industry 
to survive in the midst of global pressures without the MIDP. Lamprecht (2006 in 
Bronkhorst, Steyn and Stiglingh, 2013) in his study which weighed the perceptions of 
industry stakeholders showed that the common view is that automotive manufactures in this 
industry would not be able to compete globally without the MIDP. Flatters (2002; 2005) has 
been critical of the incentives given to the automotive industry, arguing that the MIDP has 
entrenched an infant industry that will not reach maturity. Should Rodrik (2004) be correct in 
saying that industrial policy is not so much about ‘picking’ winners, but is more about 
identifying and jettisoning ‘losers’, then the argument of Flatters (2002; 2005) of the South 
African automotive industry might have some legitimacy. With competing interests for 
resources towards the delivery of public goods to the poor in South Africa, one can raise the 
question of: “…[W]hat opportunities will be best to us as a result of the decision to opt for the 
subsidisation of car manufacturing rather than, say, cheaper education/” (Business Day, 2008 
in Bronkhorst, 2010)  
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There is a paradoxical twist to the problem of the automotive industry, because although 
heavy criticisms has been levelled against the MIDP policy which guided the automotive 
industry from 1995 to 2013, the automotive industry remains an important manufacturing 
sector in South Africa for a number of reasons. The automotive industry is the leader in 
manufacturing, and one of the largest contributors to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
the South African economy (Kaggwa, 2007; Bronkhorst, Steyn and Stiglingh, 2013).  In 
2011, the industry contributed to 6.5% of GDP. The industry is the largest producer of 
vehicles on the African continent with 87% of Africa’s share of automotive vehicle 
production attributable to South Africa (Kaggwa, 2008).   
There exists a knowledge gap with respect to studies on the MIDP. They do not offer an 
understanding of the importance of reciprocal control mechanisms (RCMs) in achieving the 
goals of industrial policy. Black (2002; 2007; 2010) gives a sympathetic view of the MIDP, 
and suggests that it has been an exceptional success and could be a useful model for other 
sectors and countries. Flatters (2002; 2005) on the other hand gives a pessimistic view of the 
MIDP and sceptical view of state intervention based on neoclassical recommendations that 
resources will be allocated to their most efficient use by free markets if state support is 
removed from the automotive industry. However, no study has been done to understand the 
shortcomings of the MIDP from a strucuralist perspective of industrial policy. Lee (2013:65) 
argues that the mistake when, when reviewing industrial policy performance is that 
“outcomes are often seen in aggregate industrial figures such as production or exports; these 
are however not a sufficient indicator for success”. The question of industrial policy is not 
properly grounded if the effectiveness of industrial policy is evaluated by indicators such as 
production or exports. A more compelling way of understanding the success of industrial 
policy, which is mediated by the theoretical framework of this study, is that successful 
industrial policy must be applied to a learning process. No particular study has asked the 
question of whether the MIDP has been able reshape the economic and political economy 
relations that exist in this sector towards learning. The alternative perspective adopted in this 
study aims to build a theoretical and empirical case for the way in which state intervention 
can reshape the political economy relations in the automotive industry towards the goal of 
learning; allocate economic rents through a set of reciprocal control mechanisms, and build 
its capacity to enforce the instruments that govern the functioning of policy.  
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The overall research question is: Was the MIDP successful in reshaping the different 
prevailing interest of the different economic and political economy actors towards learning? 
This research question is guided by three ancillary questions, which are: 
 What form did the cooperation between the state, industry and labour take and what     
implications did this have on the governance of the MIDP? 
 Did the MIDP have reciprocal control mechanisms with the aim of developing a 
globally competitive automotive industry? 
 Did the capability and capacity of the staff tasked with the management and 
implementation of the MIDP match the required industrial policies? 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The shortcomings of the MIDP in achieving its objectives is fundamentally, but not 
exclusively, rooted in the limited conceptualisation and inability to meaningfully attach the 
support to industry to reciprocal conditionalities. The lack of enforcement of reciprocal 
control mechanisms has undermined the prospects of a sustainable and internationally 
competitive industry. 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
 To set up a theoretical framework that advances the understanding of the structuralist 
approach to state intervention and industrial policy vis-à-vis the neoclassical theory 
approach.  
 To critically evaluate South African industrial policy, through the lens of the Motor 
Industry Development Programme (MIDP), as an instrument to enhance the global 
competitiveness of the South African automotive industry.  
 To identify the presence of reciprocal control mechanisms in the MIDP and critically 
engaging the extent that these mechanisms aided the achievement of MIDP objectives 
 
1.5 Methodology 
This research applies a mix of quantitative and qualitative instruments. Secondary data was 
collected and found in reports, newspaper sources, published academic journals, and public 
and industry association pages, internet pages of government agencies. The secondary data 
was useful in the literature review and theoretical framework, summarising the industrial 
policy instruments of the MIDP as well as making an assessment on the performance and 
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results of the different industry variables as well as in the presentation of up to date statistics, 
tables and recent developments in the automotive industry.  
Chapter 2 set the theoretical framework and the literature review of this study. The different 
approaches to understanding industrial policy, namely the neoclassical approach and 
structural approach were important for interpreting the type of influences that have shaped the 
general economic and industrial policies as well as the ideology, theory and practice that 
influenced the development of MIDP policy for the South African Automotive Industry. 
Alice Amsden’s theory on industrial policy; Mushtaq Khan’s understanding of learning and 
rents; and Robert Wade’s insights on state capacity in the East Asian countries was used to 
mirror and interpret the results from the empirical study. The interviews with leaders and staff 
from government, industry association representatives and labour in order to understand from 
their perspective how they interpret the meaning of the performance of the MIDP.  
The interview questions were developed around the theoretical constructs of the literature. 
Interviews were done with the following people: 
The Department of trade and Industry: Mr Mkululi Mlota (Chief Director automotive 
sector) and Dr Zavareh Rustomjee - former Director-General (1996-1999) and co-author of 
the book: The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals- Energy Complex to 
Industrialisation (1996). 
Policy Expert: Dr Sydney Mufamadi, who did his PhD on state intervention in the 
automotive industries in East Asia and South Africa, Former twice appointed as Minister of 
Local Government, Former Minister for Safety and Security and Founding Member of the 
Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
Industry Representative: Mr Robert Houdet, Executive Director at the National Association 
of Automotive Components and Allied Manufactures (NAACAM).  
Labour: I could not gain access into NUMSA. 
 
1.6 Outline of the Study 
Chapter 2 of this study sets the theoretical framework, making a distinction between 
neoclassical and structural approaches to development. The structural approach is chosen as 
the most compelling way of understanding the role of the state and industrial policy in 
development.  The literature on South Africa’s industrial policy and industrialisation path is 
explored. The automotive industry of South Africa is briefly compared to that of the Newly 
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Industrialising Countries (NICs) in East Asia. Chapter 3 takes a look at the global as well as 
the domestic automotive industries. The MIDP and its instruments are presented in detail. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings on the performance of key industry variables under the MIDP. 
This is followed by a discussion and analysis of the empirical study on the governance of the 
MIDP, RCMs of the MIDP as well as issues of state capacity. Chapter 5 provides a 
conclusion and Recommendations.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review: 
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Chapter 2: Industrial Policy  
2.1 Introduction 
The subject of much debate within development economics literature remains the question of 
whether or not there is a place for industrial policy in industrialisation and economic 
development. There are tensions within the literature, as the different perspectives are 
informed by differences in ideology and theory as well as interpretation of evidence of the 
importance of manufacturing and industry in economic growth and change, the role of the 
market and the state, and other key debates. If international trade is seen as an end in and of 
itself and as an objective of global integration, as in the neoclassical approach, then industrial 
policy becomes irrelevant. However, if development is the main and ultimate objective to be 
gained from engaging in international trade, what then becomes irrelevant is not industrial 
policy, but the prevailing prescriptions which advocate free trade for all countries. 
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Industrial Policy 
2.2.1 Neoclassical Theory 
The neoclassical model of perfect competition holds the belief that Pareto optimal allocation 
of resources will be achieved through efficient market mechanisms and therefore, government 
intervention distorts resource allocation away from market determined comparative 
advantages. Lal (1984) and Krueger (1998) argue that the government should not meddle in 
trying to allocate activities because there is pervasive government failure. In neoclassical 
theory, the operation of market forces alone is enough to lead to development, 
industrialisation and the growth of any economy. No particular importance is attached to the 
relevance and special role played by manufacturing in industrialisation (Shafaeddin, 2006).  
One reason for neoclassical theory not to find industrial policy compelling enough is because 
this theory does not acknowledge any critical differences between sectors in driving 
development. For Little and Mirrless (1974), Lal (1984), Kreuger (1988) and Lucas (1988) all 
economic activities and sectors are productive with no qualitative differences between 
activities and sectors, and therefore multipliers and linkages between sectors are not 
considered significant. Therefore, manufacturing matters as any other sector, so long as the 
line of development of manufacturing is in line with comparative advantages. The starting 
point is an economy’s capital, labour and natural resource endowments. The key to industrial 
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and developmental success is to allow the structure of production to move in conformity to 
comparative advantage. If a country’s comparative advantages are in agriculture, primary 
commodities and labour, then that particular country should focus on the production of those 
commodities and should not try to venture into manufacturing. The reverse is true for 
countries which hold comparative advantages in technology and capital (Shafaeddin, 2006).  
In the 1980’s the rise of the Washington Consensus (WC) which was shaped by neoclassical 
underpinnings, put an emphasis on the power of the free market over state intervention as 
well as encouraged mass privatization and macroeconomic stabilization. The Washington 
Consensus was marked by an explicit rejection and in fact an opposition to industrial policy 
and state intervention as an impediment to the operation of the market (Fine, 2001). However, 
free trade policy, which became the end of development in and of itself, embraced all sectors 
in the economy and was seen as a silver bullet to development. In this neoliberal theory 
“industrial policy has no place in economic development” (Shafaeddin, 2006:11). The 
rhetoric and scholarship was one of commitment to free market forces, and practice too was 
shaped by the structural adjustment programmes which sought after privatisation, 
liberalisation, and deregulation and essentially to promote the interests of private capital (Fine 
and Wiesenberger, 2013).  
Anne Krueger (1986), World Bank Chief Economist from 1982 to 1986 argued of how 
government policies and regulations were often influenced by corruption and vested interests. 
The World Bank (1993) “East Asian miracle” report makes an argument that the success of 
the high performance Asian economies (HPAEs) is attributable to maintaining 
macroeconomic stability by “getting the fundamentals right”, improving resource allocation 
and increasing productivity growth. The World Bank (1993) contends that “the promotion of 
specific individual industries made relatively little difference to the HPAEs success. Export 
orientation rather than industrial policy was mainly responsible for improving productivity 
growth in the economies”. Hence the World Bank underplayed the role of industrial policy in 
the most salient case of industrial policy success. 
Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz (1996) under the dispensation of the Post-Washington 
Consensus acknowledged the need for government intervention. The PWC acknowledges the 
problems of information failure and uncertainty which are inherent within market dynamics 
and therefore making the market prone to failure. Information failures and transaction costs 
may require the state to step in and correct these market imperfections. The state, must limit 
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itself to the provision of infrastructure, conducive conditions for business and investment, 
maintain peace and order, to fight corruption, and the transmission of technology (Fine and 
Waeyenberge (2013), Lin (2011), Krugman (ed.) 1995, Rodrik 2000, Teal 1999, Stiglitz 1996 
and 1998). With respect to the question of government failure, the PWC acknowledges ways 
to enhance the performance of government as a ways to improve markets (Stiglitz, 1996). An 
improvement in good governance and promoting democracy in market economies is seen as 
the silver bullet to the problems of underdevelopment (Rodriguez 2011). 
There has been a departure from the mainstream orthodox theories and the rise of revised 
versions of neoclassical economic approaches to development such as the new structural 
economics (NSE) and the like. From the entry point of market imperfections and information 
asymmetries, Rodrik (2011) argues that market failures call for industrial policy. Lin’s new 
structural economics is another framework in which the government has a key role to play in 
industrial policy (Lin, 2011). The central focal point of Lin’s analysis is based on the notion 
of comparative advantage (Fine and Waeyenberge, 2013). The emphasis is that the state 
should support the firms and industries that can exploit a country’s area of latent comparative 
advantage. In the simplest terms, “latent” comparative advantage is taken to mean that 
“countries should prepare themselves for market participation in what will be appropriate 
sectors in a decade or so in the future” (Fine, 2013). The market is embedded in non-market 
institutions such as property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic 
stabilization and for social insurance and conflict management, and these institutions need to 
function in such a way as to serve the needs of the market (Rodrik, 2000). The government 
should play a facilitating role in improving the provision of hard infrastructure such as 
telecommunications roads and transport as well as soft infrastructure such as regulating the 
financial system, institutions, and improving the education system. In doing so, the state must 
be careful not to descend into rent-seeking by overextending itself into picking and creating 
winners because it cannot do so.  
2.2.2 Structuralist Theory and the Need for Strategic Industrial Policy 
The structuralist approach to industrial policy has its roots in Latin America. Scholars such as 
Raoul Prebisch, Hans Singer, Celso Furtado, and Oswaldo Sunkel argued in favour of the 
transformation of the industrial structures of developing countries from the primary 
production of raw materials and natural resources towards value addition, manufacturing and 
industrial goods (Hunt, 1989; Amsden, 1997).  This approach to development can simply be 
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characterised as an inductive approach where general conclusions are drawn from specific 
empirical observations by looking at the rapid industrialisation of concrete experiences of the 
early developing countries as well as the East Asian newly industrialising countries (Amsden, 
2001). By looking at these observations, there emerges a set of principles by which essential 
foundations of industrial dynamics are induced that can be tested and refined against specific 
national, sectorial and industry case studies (Amsden, 2001). This type of theorising has 
resulted in a diversity of approaches in the study of industrial policy that seeks not to apply a 
“one-size-fits-all” model but one which is context specific and tries to find decisive factors 
that affect performance for any one nation, sector or industry (Fine, 2013). Structualist 
scholars challenge the notion that the market is fundamental and a superior mechanism for 
resource allocation. The world is one that operates under uncertainty, imperfect competition 
and information. Instruments such as subsidies, tariffs, exchange rates which may be used in a 
discretionary manner by the government contribute to major market distortions. Development 
is informed by the need to “learn by doing” and capacity building. Structuralist theories of 
industrial development are rooted in empirical evidence which shows that periods of high and 
sustained growth were led by manufacturing accompanied by state led industrial policy 
(Amsden, 1997; 2001). 
Unlike neoclassical economists, Kaldor (1967) argues that the manufacturing industry is 
unlike any other industry in the sense that it is the only that yields dynamic increasing returns 
and has important multipliers and linkages with other sectors in the economy. In order to 
develop an economy, any country ought to develop a competitive manufacturing sector.  
There are six defining characteristics of dynamic increasing returns in manufacturing: 
 There are increasing and irreversible gains in productivity of capital and labour. 
 Manufacturing determines the productivity of the economy as a whole. 
 Manufacturing sector creates dynamic linkages between productivity gains in 
manufacturing and the economy as a whole. 
 Manufacturing draws surplus labour from the agricultural and services sectors. 
 The expansion of the manufacturing activities helps reduce balance of payment 
problems. 
 The manufacturing sector is the most dynamic source of income, savings, demand 
and foreign exchange that are important for development of the whole economy. 
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Structuralst literature opposes the view that “East Asian economies succeeded mainly because 
their governments followed economic policies which did not obstruct the natural growth-
inducing processes of capitalist market economies” (Wade, 1995:116). Wade (1990), Gore 
(1996), Amsden (1997), Chang (1996, 1997) argue that East Asian countries reflect success 
cases of a strong state-led approach to development that was marked by the state’s power and 
autonomy to formulate and create policy together with capitalist forces. Countries such as 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Indonesia are amongst others countries seen as modern 
cases of developmental states. The notion of a developmental state emerged within a 
framework that might be called the old development economics. The developmental state 
(DS) was developed in opposition to the prescriptions and analysis of the WC in the 1980’s. 
The DS argues that substantial state intervention was present to obstruct what would 
ordinarily happen under the market mechanism. The key feature of the DS was its deliberate 
aim of “getting the prices wrong (Amsden, 1997) and “governing the market” (Wade, 1990) 
and therefore not conforming to the dictates of the market. 
2.3 A Structuralist Case for Industrial Policy 
2.3.1Introduction 
Industrial policy remains contested and there prevail diverse theoretical fronts within the 
economic literature. Amongst those who define industrial policy, there is no uniform 
definition and scope of functions concerned. Pinder (1982) adopts a broad definition of 
industrial policy that includes policies designed to support industry, including fiscal and 
monetary incentives for investment, direct public investment and public procurement 
programs, incentives for research and development, major programs for the creation of 
“national champions” in strategic sectors and policies for support of small and medium 
enterprises. Peres and Primi (2008:14) argue that the disadvantage of broad definitions of 
industrial policy like these is the difficulty associated with analysing why and how to design, 
implement and assess policy at the national level.  
Johnson (1984) in Chang (1996) on the other hand adopts narrow definitions of industrial 
policy. Johnson (1984) in Chang (1996:111) takes the view that industrial policy is “a 
summary term for the activities of governments that are intended to develop or retrench 
various industries in a national economy in order to maintain global competitiveness”. Chang 
(1996:111) proposes “to define industrial policy as a policy aimed at particular industries (and 
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firms as their components), to achieve the outcomes that are perceived by the state to be 
efficient for the economy as a whole. This definition is close to what is usually called 
selective industrial policy”. 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996:16) suggest that “industrial policy should not be generally defined, 
no matter whether on a broad or narrow canvas of issues and/or policy instruments. Rather it 
should be drawn from the conditions specifically governing the economic (and political) 
formulation under consideration”. Different economic dynamics of capital accumulation and 
economic, social and political structures and interests influence policy-making. Therefore the 
use of strategies and industrial policy instruments requires an assessment of the broader 
economy and different industries within it.  
This research paper uses the key structuralist insights to analyse industrial policy, and its 
challenges, because it adequately addresses our understanding of the role of the state in 
development. The context specific exercise advocated for by Fine and Rustomjee (1996:16) 
allows the economy itself; its nature and character to define for us what the industrial policy 
should be. The structuralist school of thought has a body of literature that is rooted in 
concrete conditions underscored by development theories and empirical engagement. One of 
the key characteristics of structuralist theory is the recognition that emulation of what worked 
in other countries is critical (Amsden, 2001). However, political economy considerations; 
namely the interests of different classes and how they are mediated by the state, are also 
important in informing the context specificity of policy (Fine, 2011; 2013), Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996), Khan (1995) and Kim (1997) argue that policy involves a negotiation 
process where different prevailing political and economic interests influence certain decisions 
about rents allocation and policy direction. The state and the market as integrally related, 
especially in the context of development. Exploring the underlying factors that allow for the 
productive synergies between the state and the market and how such factors come together in 
place should really be the basis of our analysis. Both the state and the market, and their 
interaction, are themselves determined by the economic, political and ideological interests 
which they represent 
Unlike the structuralist approach to industrial policy, neoclassical economics lacks the 
understanding of the specific dynamics of industrial policy which requires us to delve into the 
factors that drive any specific economy and how specific sectors fit together with the 
underlying combination of economic and political interests and changing external market 
24 
 
conditions. There is an understatement of specific political economy considerations as well as 
a denial to the importance of pro-active industrial policy. Neoclassical theory has had the 
effect of narrowing down how industrial policy is conceived and more so standing in 
opposition to industrial policy. Government policies addressing market failures are necessary 
only in so far as they improve markets to function better. Neoclassical economic theory of 
development appears to be unimpressive in an economic environment where industrial policy 
has to be strong.  
2.3.2 Infant industry protection 
The role of protection in early industrialization in Western Europe has been well documented 
by authors such as Chang (2002). In addition, empirical studies of the East Asian newly 
industrialising countries have documented the role of strategic trade interventions in 
promoting manufacturing growth, technology upgrading and industrial deepening (Peres and 
Primi, 2008). Contrary to the neoclassical perception that now-developed countries have 
become rich by pursuing free trade policies, Chang (2002) indicates that countries like 
Germany, Britain, United States of America, and France, did have an industrial policy that 
intervened in markets through the usage of tariffs to protect infant industries. Deraniyagala 
(2001) argue that the mainstream account of free trade as the only winning model of trade is a 
myth. It overlooks the historical experiences of industrialised countries which depended on 
varying degrees of selective protection in conjunction with other factors and industrial 
policies (Peres and Primi, 2008). 
Structuralists argue that it is useful to point out that protection should be confined to the 
manufacturing industry which has high technological and production linkages unlike 
agriculture (Shaffadien, 2000; Peres and Primi, 2008). List (1856) further emphasised that in 
order to avoid the danger of monopoly power and inefficient use of protection by domestic 
firms, protection should not be given for prolonged periods of time and at unnecessary high 
levels. 
It is essential to understand the infant industry argument in the context of emulation and catch 
up strategies; as a way of catching up with early industrializing countries in the development 
and industrialization process which are way ahead of other newly industrializing countries 
(Chang, 2002).The reasoning behind the argument is that industries in developing countries 
have difficulty competing with established competitive firms in developed countries and so 
protection should provide them with enough time to develop until they can compete 
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internationally (Shafaeddin, 2000). It is only after reaching a certain level of maturity and 
achieving the gains of learning-by doing that domestic firms can engage in competition with 
their international competitors and trade liberalization can be gradually restored (Peres and 
Primi, 2008).  
2.3.3 Learning Rents 
Temporary protection is a rent that is transferred to the protected infant industries and 
therefore needs to be managed. In conventional economic terms, rents refer to excess incomes 
which, in neoclassical economic models should not exist in efficient markets. The concept of 
an economic rent can be originally found in Ricardo’s theory of rent where landowners 
appropriated and captured an economic profit from the peasants who farmed on their land 
(Khan, 2000).  
 
Khan (2009) acknowledges the need to create rents that allow for the learning process to 
occur for domestic industry. Khan’s (2009:1) perspective is that “development is 
fundamentally about learning to use modern technologies to create jobs and prosperity in poor 
countries”.  Technological upgrading is not a passive and automatic process. It involves a 
learning process which requires time and experience and it is often costly and risky. Learning 
plays an important in industrialisation and takes various forms which include: learning by 
using, imitating and adapting; learning by studying and training; learning by experience; 
learning by doing and learning by trial and error. Selective and targeted interventions are 
required on part of the government to promote learning at industry level (Shafaeddin, 2006). 
Developing countries face the problem of catching up with developed countries. The problem 
of catching up, according to Khan (2009), can be defined as: 
 
 Achieving the minimum quality that allows entry into globally competitive production 
for a variety of products 
 Spreading these basic manufacturing and productive capabilities across the working 
population, and 
 Systematically moving up the quality ladder across product categories 
 
This problem can be overcome through the process of learning how to use new technologies 
in different sectors (Khan, 2009). This requires the artificial creation of learning rents to 
accelerate learning in infant industries (Khan, 2000).  
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In the neoclassical literature all rents are inefficient, and their removal is the desirable way for 
the competitive market to achieve greater efficiency and better economic outcomes. 
Structuralists such as Khan (2000) and List (1856) on the other hand do agree that rents can 
be bad, however, this is the very reason they need to be managed through industrial policy. 
There is scope for certain kinds of rents to play an essential role in development. The 
acceleration of industrial and technological learning requires the granting and enforcement of 
conditional policy-induced rents to allow producers in the learning sectors to catch up and 
become globally competitive (Khan, 2000).  
2.3.4 Reciprocal Control Mechanisms and Industrial Policy 
The function of industrial policy then becomes to give and to manage rents. Appropriate 
institutions and conditions need to exist such that appropriate rents and management systems 
can ensure technological progress (Khan, 2009). However, there are many challenges and 
uninsurable risks in industrial policy. There are two main arguments that mainstream 
economists often make against industrial policy. The first argument is that governments are in 
no way better suited than markets to make economically rational decisions about the kind of 
sectors that are most likely to be successful. In other words, they are not good at “picking 
winners”. Moreover, protected industries never come to maturity or grow up, but they remain 
in perpetual need of government support (Rodrik, 2004). The second argument has to do with 
the political economy of industrial policy. The objection is that there is a high risk of political 
capture by special interest groups, particularly companies who devote their energies to “rent-
seeking” instead of competing on the market. 
It is against this background that development theory scholars argue that in order to 
circumvent such problems, governments need to design industrial policies where the state is 
“embedded” – in the terminology of Evans (1995) – with the private sector while maintaining 
“autonomy” from elites who seek to elicit rents from the state. Amsden makes her case for 
industrial policy and government intervention, in the face of fierce criticism by observing that 
reciprocal control mechanisms (RCMs) were used in successful cases of industrial policy. 
RCMs, through their internal functioning, are required to enable learning, generate enough 
productivity and to tackle and minimise corruption and unproductive rents which were “the 
scourge of late industrialization” (Amsden, 2001:11).  
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At the heart of these issues is the relationship between the state and business. Reflecting back 
on the different approaches to development and industrial policy across different theories, 
most literature, such as that on the DS fails to provide an adequate understanding of 
development because of the incorrect dichotomy between the state and the market. Rather 
than reducing the state to an entity which is in direct opposition to the market, Fine (1996, 
2013) rejects this as an analytical starting point and argues that the state and the market are 
more often than not, integrally related. In the context of development, developmental projects 
depend on the relative interaction of the state and market, as determined by the economic, 
political and ideological interests they represent. The significance of RCMs becomes more 
visible, because they act as the key contact point between business and the state where policy 
is made. Kapadia (2012:7) argues that “Alice shows us what is at stake is not states nor 
markets per se but something more general, control”. Industrial policy works best when there 
is discipline on capital where the state monitors its instrument-target relationships and 
engages in the effective management of economic rents by minimizing the abuse of economic 
rents and fending off demands for uncompensated rents by the private sector (Amsden, 2001). 
For Amsden “the reciprocal control mechanism enables learning in all contexts” (Kapadia, 
2012: 19). 
Amsden (2007:7) argues that the key principle behind their success in the use of RCMs was 
the reciprocity principle they enforced. Reciprocity disciplined subsidy recipients and thereby 
minimized government failures. Subsidies were allocated to make manufacturing profitable –
to convert money lender to financiers and importers to industrialists – but did not become 
giveaways. Recipients of subsidies were subjected to monitorable performance standards that 
were redistributive in nature and results-oriented. The reciprocal control mechanism thus 
transformed the inefficiency and veniality associated with government intervention into 
collective good (2000:7). 
In the newly industrialising countries, success in manufacturing, product diversification and 
upgrading had much to do with  governments’ use of RCMs. Firms received support, favours 
and benefits from the state only of they met certain performance requirements such as targets 
in exporting, local content requirements, product specifications, management techniques and 
as well as employment codes. When these targets and performance requirements are not met, 
this lead to the termination of supporting benefits by the government. A key to success was 
the ability to abandon those projects that were not performing, whereas on the other hand, 
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those economies that became captured by business interests who became too dependent on 
the state were not as successful (Amsden, 2001; Shafaeddin, 2006; Wade, 2010).  
2.3.5 State capacity and industrial policy 
Reciprocal control mechanisms need strong state capacity to manage and execute. The RCMs 
highlighted above within the small-scale industrial policy spectrum have received little 
attention in the existing literature of industrial policy. The focus of the East Asian policy has 
rather focused on the high-tech and big scale end of the industrial policy spectrum such as 
picking winners. The strong administrative skills and expertise in countries such as Taiwan 
and Thailand to name a few ensured that the RCMs were effectively implemented. 
In Taiwan, state officials in an industrial extension service called the industrial development 
bureau (IDB) which comprised of a professional cadre of roughly 180 economic engineers 
with an understanding of the need to transform the industrial structure of the economy. The 
core function of these IDB officials, who were meritoriously selected by expertise profile and 
through formal examination, was to go out to monitor factories around the country for several 
days per month. These officials with strong negotiation skills used their administrative 
discretion to “nudge” and push factory owners to upgrade, improve factory layout and 
production, introduce new tools, diversify their products and encourage new ways to promote 
competitiveness and force alliances between foreign subsidiaries and domestic suppliers. The 
IDB officials used a range of industrial policy instruments to incrementally pull, push and 
steer the incentive environment of firms week after week, year after year and decade after 
decade. These “street-level” officials had a strong monitoring function (Wade, 2009:385).  
One of the IDB core functions was to maintain a close watch on the productive capabilities of 
Taiwanese firms and to seek out ways in enhancing these capabilities. The IDB officials were 
monitoring imports and what was happening on factory floors to see whether there was space 
for replacing imports with Taiwan manufactured goods. This nudging and the alertness to 
developments in the private sector ensured that projects that were successful were further 
assisted and those that did not improve competitiveness were cut off from protection and 
concessional finance. An agency called the Investment commission specially “scrutinized” 
foreign direct investment (FDI) proposals to from the point of view of making sure they 
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benefited Taiwan” (Wade, 2009:358).1 Similarly, Thailand’s RCMs was managed by very 
well educated and experienced economic engineers who in most cases, government were 
better educated than private business men giving them a negotiation edge. These government 
officials’ job was to make manufacturing competitive as well as circumvent difficulties posed 
to industrialization (Amsden, 2001:9; 23). These cases highlight the importance of the role of 
building state capacity for the success of RCMs is crucial. 
2.4 A problematization of the industrial and economic policy context of 
South Africa 
The industrial and economic policy in South Africa has undergone a number of changes 
under three distinct phases. The first phase began in the year 1948 when the apartheid 
government took office up until the end of the apartheid system. The second phase began in 
1994 with the National African Congress (ANC) taking office under the dispensation of a 
democratic South Africa. The year 2007 was also marked by a new era with the adoption of 
the National Industrial Policy Framework. This section discusses and builds in the critical 
discussions of the South African economic and industrial policy in general, and the 
automotive policy strategy in particular within these three distinct periods. 
 
2.4.1 Apartheid Industrialisation 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996) argue that the apartheid regime failed to develop coherent policies 
for industrialisation. The present realities of unemployment, abject poverty and inequality 
cannot be analysed without understanding the South African system of accumulation which 
                                                          
1 “The IDB officials used their influence over important licenses to get multinational firms to 
operate in Taiwan to switch from imported inputs to domestically produced inputs” (Wade, 
2009:358). One case in point is the glass-making industry in Taiwan, where the IDB officials 
suggested that Philips strike a long-term supply contract and offer technical help to two or 
three local firms, however Philips refused, saying it was happy with the import arrangements 
it had in place. What the IDB official did was to effect mysterious delays in the authorization 
of Philips’ glass imports, which had previously been automatically granted. Philips laid a 
complaint to the Minister of Economic Affairs who lengthened the delays. Philips eventually 
got the message and entered into an agreement with domestic suppliers.  
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characterises the South African industrial structure and can be termed the ‘minerals-energy 
complex’ (MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). The MEC can be defined as the inherited 
minerals and energy intensive path-dependent structure which was a means of integrating 
British and Afrikaner capitalists and consists of a synergy between the mining industry and 
fossil fuel energy system that sustains it (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996).  
This complex system would later have ramifications for the post-apartheid period where the 
economy became increasingly financialized. This dominance of mineral capital accumulation 
and bias towards mining led to the limited development of globally competitive 
manufacturing industries (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). Unlike the East Asian NICs which had 
dedicated policies towards import substitution industrialisation (ISI) together with export-
oriented industrialisation (EOI), the policies in South Africa were fragmented and incoherent 
and not dedicated specifically to industrialisation during the apartheid period. However, what 
happened is that the creation of state owned enterprises led to a rise in the number of energy 
dependant industries all of which were important for the extraction, processing and 
transportation of upstream minerals in accordance with the structure of the economy (Fine 
and Rustomjee, 1996).  
Although the apartheid government did implement industrial support by protecting certain 
targeted industries such as motor vehicles through subsidies and tariffs, it created inwardly-
oriented, overly fragmented and inefficient manufacturing with low volume output, and 
associated high unit costs (Black, 2001). South Korea, “whose per capita manufacturing value 
added in 1961 was 1/7 that of South Africa and whose car production was 1/6 that of South 
Africa as late as 1980 is now a major independent player in the world auto industry, with 
almost complete localisation of parts (95 per cent by 1988, when it was 55 per cent in South 
Africa), whereas South Africa still basically remains a typical Third World producer 
assembling too many models at high costs under foreign licensing” (Chang, 1998:56). The 
ineffective policies under the apartheid regime reflect the failures of the apartheid government 
to develop coherent policies for building a successful automotive manufacturing industry. 
The subsequent export-oriented MIDP, which would later be introduced in the post-apartheid 
period as an accompaniment to liberalization, could not build on these policies at all. On the 
other hand, drawing on Amsden (2001), the case of the East Asian NICs informs us that 
successful export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) in often cases must build on import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI), lest all that a country does is low skill manufacturing in 
export processing zones a la Maquiladoras in Mexico.  
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2.4.2 Key Post-Apartheid Policies and Industrialisation 
Attempts by the government in the early 1990’s to find an industrial policy framework 
resulted in a document called the Support Measures for the Enhancement of the International 
Competitiveness of South Africa’s Industrial Sector which later became widely known as the 
‘supply-side’ document (SSD). Another piece of work which was influenced by the thinking 
behind the SSD was the Industrial Strategy Project (ISP) study called Improving 
Manufacturing Performance in South Africa (Chang, 1998). These documents placed 
emphasis on the reorientation of South Africa’s industrial promotion from ‘demand-side’ 
measures such as the pro-active use of tariffs, quotas and other policy measures to ‘supply-
side’ measures such as investment incentives, development of human resources, research and 
development (R&D) support, accessibility to information on production methods, and 
creating favourable international market conditions (Chang, 1998). Chang (1998:56) suggests 
that these policies under the ISP did not measure up to the enormous scale of industrial 
restructuring that was required for South Africa.  The industrial restructuring required for 
South Africa “is of a scale comparable to, or even greater than, that achieved by even the 
fastest growing East Asian economies”. The MIDP, along with policies for the clothing and 
textiles sector were for a while a lone example of sectorial policy after the end of apartheid. 
Fine (1995) argues that The ISP was inspired by the flexible-specialisation (flec-spec) 
approach to policy in the early 1990’s. The issues covered in the flec-spec approach, which is 
mediated by an understanding of flexibility within labour markets include: changes in 
technology and the organisation of production; subcontracting; skills and training; and 
consumer tastes for niche markets. This approach is marked by a number of shortcomings in 
that it advances an argument to limit state intervention and the need for labour to reach 
compromises with capital based on flexible production (Fine, 1995). For Fine (1995) the flec-
spec approach fails to address unemployment on a significant scale, but it is also based on an 
ill-founded misunderstanding of the South African economic structure, corporate power and 
class interests which are in reality underpinned by the MEC. The involvement of Anthony 
Black (1994), the academic advisor to the motor industry task group (MITG) as well as a key 
player in the automotive industry policy process, in the ISP resulted in the adoption of the 
strategy for the automotive industry which influenced the MIDP policy (Desai and Habib, 
1997). 
The post-apartheid period’s economic structure and policy choices, particularly between 1994 
and 2006, reflect continuity in the dominance of the MEC (Fine, 2008). The orthodox 
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economic policies reflect the prevailing economic views of Washington Consensus type 
policies. The main elements of these policies include pro-market policies, trade and financial 
liberalisation, labour market reforms, fiscal austerity, tight fiscal policy, inflation targeting 
and the adoption of a wide range of supply-side economic policies (Fine, 2009). The period 
between 1994 and 2006 was marked by the policies such as the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), the Growth Employment and Redistribution as well as the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) (Newman, 2011). 
GEAR in particular shifted away from demand side measure such as the use of trade policy 
instruments and focused on supply-side measures which were supposed to lower the costs of 
doing business (Newman, 2011). These policies have been criticised by Newman (2011) as 
not having a focus on transforming the industrial structure of the economy. They however 
focused on increasing investments and the growth rate which was believed will resolve the 
high inequality and income disparities that exist between certain classes and races in South 
Africa. Manufacturing, investment, employment and growth levels have not been 
significantly improved. Attempts at economic transformation through policy strategies such 
AsgiSA promoted black economic empowerment (BEE), which has resulted in the emergence 
of a black capitalist class without addressing transformative development (Newman, 2011). 
McKenzie and Pons-Vignon (2012) argue that the South African economy is increasingly 
financialised thus promoting particularly short term investments into the unproductive finance 
sector at the expense of investment into the real economy. This financialisation is consistent 
with the needs of the big and profitable MEC associated sectors and conglomerates in the 
post-apartheid South Africa (McKenzie and Pons-Vignon, 2012).  
2.4.3 The National Industrial Policy Framework and the Industrial Action Policy Plan 
Up until 2007 when the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) and the Industrial 
Policy Action Plan (IPAP, 2007) were introduced, there had been no formal and coherent 
industrial policy. Almost all industrial policy interventions after 1994 were still within the 
MEC and its associated interests. The NIPF and the IPAP are rooted in structural analysis of 
the economy in general and addressing the key constraints to industrialisation in particular 
(DTI, 2007). The NIPF’s vision for South Africa’s industrialisation path can be summarised 
as follows (DTI, 2007): 
 The facilitation of diversification beyond the traditional sectors of the economy 
 The promotion of a more labour-absorbing industrialisation path 
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 The promotion of a broader-based industrialisation path 
 Contribution into the industrial development on the African continent  
The IPAP 2007 and its subsequent iterations targets value-added sectors with high 
employment and growth multipliers. The automotive industry has been target as one of the 
key manufacturing sectors. The Automotive Production Development Programme (APDP) 
which was introduced in 2013 is the new policy that governs the South African automotive 
industry. The APDP remains similar to the MIDP in that it shares a similar implementation 
structure. Continuities with previous policies looms large in South Africa and therefore 
further research is needed to assess the extent to which strong-holds of neoliberal policy still 
influence policy pertaining to the automotive industry. Pitot (2013) argues that valuable 
lessons from MIDP were not acted upon in implementing the APDP. The APDP is not the 
focus of this research; however, the findings on MIDP will have value for the APDP & policy 
in South Africa more broadly. 
2.5 Theoretical Considerations of Industrial Policy in the Automotive 
Industries of Newly Industrialising Countries vis-à-vis the Industrial Policy 
in South Africa 
The development of the auto industry in various part of the world, and particularly in the 
latecomers also known as the newly industrializing countries (NICs) has provided general 
theoretical points and discussions of industrial policy with specific reference to the auto 
industry. By situating the study of the South African automotive industry and orientation of 
economic policies in South Africa vis-à-vis these NICs we can make recommendations for 
the need for a more structuralist industrial policy stance in South Africa.  
According to Jenkins (1995) the effectiveness of state intervention in the East Asian NICs 
was attributable to the factors which emerged in 2.3 above as the key structuralist insights 
with which to analyse industrial policy and its challenges. The effectiveness of industrial 
policy in countries such as South Korea entailed the protection of infant industries; the 
removal of privileges from particular firms; and the implementation of appropriate policy 
instruments at the states disposal. Further, a good capacity of the state to formulate and to 
implement policies effectively; a degree of autonomy of the state from the dominant class or 
class fractions which enabled the state to pursue goals that do not reflect the short-term 
interests of these groups; ensuring congruence between the objectives of the state and those of 
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leading actors within the sector; and the creation and management of rents by the state to 
encourage productive led to the creation of successful automotive industries (Jenkins, 1995). 
By contrast, when bringing to bear the problem for the South African industrial and economic 
policy it is clear that there is a lack of a vision for a coherent and concrete industrial policy 
(Chang, 1998). This lack of vision during and after the apartheid period has resulted in lost 
opportunities to restructure the South African automotive industry at a pace and scale that is 
comparable to East Asian NICs such as South Korea (Chang, 1998). The general direction 
which industrial polices in South Africa have taken is one that is typified by Washington 
Consensus policies. It appears unimpressive when stacked up against the structuralist-type 
policies that existed in the NICs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Global and the South African Automotive 
Industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
3.1 An Overview of the Global Automotive Industry 
The global auto industry can be divided into 3 broad sectors. The first sector comprises of 
original component manufacturers (OEMs) which manufacture the final product vehicles 
immediately before they are released into the market for sale. The second sector comprises of 
component manufacturers which produce automotive parts and accessories which go into the 
manufacturing of vehicles. The third sector is the aftermarket or the motor trade sector which 
consists of independent component and accessory dealers and repair shops (Barnes & Morris, 
2008). The automotive industry is the most globally integrated industry with a highly 
concentrated firm structure in which a few large leading firms dominate and exercise control 
over their global supply chains (Barnes & Morris, 2008; Gastrow, 2012). Manufacturing 
value is significantly derived from the activities of component suppliers as opposed to vehicle 
assembly. Yet, the character of the producer driven value chain in the global automotive 
industry gives OEMs the pre-eminence to govern the global value chain by determining the 
scale and scope of the automotive component supplier activities (Barnes & Morris, 2008). 
In the global arena, automotive production is spread across six regions, namely Western 
Europe, North America, Japan, South America, Asia-Pacific and Eastern Europe (AIEC, 
2013). Table 3.1 below gives a summary of vehicle production in the top 10 countries as well 
as South Africa. In 2009 China ranked first in vehicle production with a global share of 
22.5%, displacing the USA which in previous years was in the lead. South Africa is a small 
player in the global automotive market with only 0.6 % of the market. South Africa’s internal 
market is small, which means that expanding and exporting to global markets is necessary for 
international competitiveness. In 2005, the key vehicle export destinations of South Africa 
were China, Zimbabwe and Malawi. However in 2012 South Africa had expanded its market 
and was exporting to countries such as the USA, UK, Japan, China, Algeria and Germany 
(AIEC, 2011; 2013).  
Trade and investment liberalisation has facilitated the movement easy movement of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), cross-border trade and globalisation of production (Gastrow, 2012). 
Large emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil have become booming production 
sites with advantages of large domestic markets and large reserves of low cost labour. Vehicle 
production not consumed in the local market is often exported back to developed countries 
(Gastrow, 2012). Factors such as vehicle customization, export and transportation costs, 
stable political environments and geographical proximity to markets have to be taken into 
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account by OEMs in deciding where to locate production. Furthermore, regional, national and 
local conditions remain important aspects in the determination of production sites. Local 
conditions such as labour market regulations, purchasing power, consumer tastes, standards 
and industry regulations, innovation propensities, as well as public policies such as tariffs, 
incentives, taxation and other instruments of industrial policy are also taken into account by 
OEMs in the decisions they make (Gastrow, 2012).  
The 2008/2009 global financial crises had a severe impact on the global automotive industry, 
most particularly for developed nations as sites of production (Gastrow, 2012). With the 
exception of South Africa, Mexico and Thailand, most developing countries were less 
affected by the crisis in comparison to developed countries (Gastrow, 2012). The reason for 
South Africa, Mexico and Thailand being hard hit amongst the developing countries is due to 
their heavily export-based industries. The response by many OEMs during the crises was to 
act in a defensive manner by downsizing capacity, cutting costs, restructuring and increasing 
retail prices (Gastrow, 2012). These measures had a ripple effect and negative impacts on the 
lower tiers of the supply chain (Gastrow 2012). Table 3.2 below shows that vehicle 
production was affected in significantly negative way. The South African share in global 
production fell from 0.80% in 2008 to 0.61% in 2009 and remained stable, without full 
recovery afterwards. The governments of many countries such as the U.S and France stepped 
in and intervened to extend a life line to their auto industry companies by bailing them out 
(AIEC, 2010).    
Table 3.1: World Rankings – Vehicle Production 2013 
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Table 3.2 Global production of vehicles 
Global Production (Millions) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Global 
Production 
(Millions) 66.55 69.33 73.12 70.52 70.52 61.7 77.62 79.88 84.14 
SA Production 
(Millions) 
0.525 0.588 0.535 0.535 0.563 0.374 0.472 0.533 0.539 
SA Share in 
Global 
Production (%)  
0.79% 0.85% 0.73% 0.80% 0.61% 0.61% 0.61% 0.67% 0.64% 
Source: NAAMSA, 2013 
The South African Automotive Industry 
3.2A Historical Overview  
The first developments in automotive production in the South African automotive industry 
began with the entrance of Ford and General Motors in the 1920’s as manufactures for the 
domestic market (Black, 2001). The industry witnessed rapid expansion for the first four 
decades with the entrance of many other car manufacturers. By 1960, the auto industry which 
was characterised by an import substitution type strategy, very high protective tariffs, small 
plants and the production of many models in small volumes had in total produced 87 000 
vehicles by the 8 manufacturers present at that time. This put South Africa on the map as the 
largest vehicle manufacturer amongst the developing countries (Black, 2001). However, the 
level of local content remained low at only 20%, which prompted the introduction of the first 
of a series of targeted industrial policies, which entailed local content programmes which 
would run from 1961 until 1995. From the first phase up until phase five, local content 
increased up to 66% for all light vehicles, and the local content was measured by 
mass/weight. Political developments such as the sanctions against South Africa meant that an 
inward-looking strategy had to be strengthened. The aim of the local content programmes was 
to protect the local market from vehicle and component imports (Altman and Mayer, 2003). 
The first five of these local content programmes ran from 1961 to 1987. The last phase (VI), 
which was marked by a substantial change of direction, was the first attempt to rectify the 
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problems of an inward-looking, overly fragmented, low volume output and associated high 
unit costs, was introduced in 1989 up till 1995.This last phase was marked by the need for 
government to protect the market in an efficient way, reduce the industry’s net foreign 
exchange usage and substitute for imports (Black and Bhanisi, 2007).The measurement of 
local content under this phase was not by mass or weight, but rather by value, and the 
requirement was lowered from the previous phases down to 50% (Black, 2001, Black and 
Bhanisi, 2007). Phase VI came under heavy criticism for having the reverse of the impact that 
it was intended for, which was the proliferation of makes and models, improving economies 
of scale and encouraging specialisation (Black, 2001). 
3.3THE MIDP 
By the early 1990’s it had become clear that the focus on the domestic market was not going 
to be a long-run sustainable strategy considering the small market of South Africa. The 
industry had to find another way of being competitive, and venturing into export markets 
seemed to be the only sensible decision. Furthermore, the industry faced pressures to comply 
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules. The need to promote and sustain the industry in a less protected 
manner was identified (Damoense and Simon, 2004). 
In 1992 the Motor Industry Task Group, comprising of industry experts and academics such 
as Anthony Black (Desai and Habib, 1997), was appointed by the South African government 
to advise the government on long-term and short term strategies for the direction to which the 
South African automotive industry would take (AEIC, 2013). The local content requirements 
implemented during the apartheid regime were proving to be a challenge and limitation as a 
policy tool for sustaining the growth and development of the local automotive industry in 
light of the global development in the auto industry (Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn, 2007). The 
initial recommendations of the MITG were not supported by the major stakeholders of the 
automotive industry. The National Association of Automobile Manufacturing of South Africa 
(NAAMSA), the National Association of Automotive Component and Allied Manufactures 
(NAACAM), the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) and other 
stakeholders held different views than those recommended by the MITG especially with 
regards to aspects such as rationalisation, the affordability of vehicles, duties and the Import-
Export facility (Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn, 2007). One can draw an inference that the reason 
for the divergence of views with regards to the recommendations of the MITG, which were 
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evidently influenced by the strategy adopted from the Industrial Strategy Support (ISP) 
document, is that although this ‘most important industrial policy document’ advocated for the 
need to ‘improve manufacturing performance’ – as the title of the document suggests- in 
actual fact the ISP in a subtle manner dissociated itself from the right kind and degree of 
targeting required, given the necessary industrial restructuring needed for South Africa 
(Chang, 1998:57). The Board of Tariffs and Trade was subsequently tasked with the 
formulation and revision of the customs dispensation programme for the auto industry and to 
put into reconsideration the initial recommendations of the MITG and provide feedback 
accordingly. The Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP), which is the seventh 
iteration of automotive industry policy was adopted and implemented as from the 1 
September 1995 as the national auto industry policy (Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn, 2007).  
The South African MIDP took a similar structure to the Australian export facilitation scheme 
(Flatters, 2004). The primary goal and reasoning behind the creation of the MIDP was to 
develop a globally integrated and competitive local motor vehicles and components auto 
industry through the promotion of exports (Black and Bhanisi, 2007; Damoense and Simon, 
2004; DTI, 2003). The other goals of the MIDP according to DTI (2004) and AIEC (2013), 
which were to support the competiveness of the auto industry included: 
 The stability of long-term employment 
 Improving the quality and affordability of vehicles 
 The improvement of the industry’s balance of payments, which was to be achieved 
through an increase in exports 
 Rationalisation of domestic car production  
 Attract foreign investments 
 Make greater contribution to the economic growth of the country by increasing 
production 
What the orientation of these objectives reveals about the strategy for developing the South 
African automotive industry is subject to interpretation, however this encouragement of 
investments, improved balance of payments, rationalisation etc. is subordinate to the 
industrial policy weight required for the transformed needs of the South African economy. 
Local content policies, diversification of the components basket, prioritisation of creating a 
‘national’ industry, joint-venture participation by local capital and pro-active employment 
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creation instead of stability were crucial objectives that were not kept in sight by the MIDP 
policy (Barchiesi, 1997).  
3.3.1 The Instruments of MIDP 
The objectives of MIDP were to be achieved through a number of policy instruments. These 
included: a duty/tariff phase down; a Productive Asset Allowance (PAA) and an Import-
Export complementation scheme and a Duty Free Allowance (DFA) all to be discussed in 
detail below. These instruments replaced the local content requirements which were in effect 
before the MIDP. They operated in different ways to encourage an increase in exports, local 
content or foreign investments.  
Table 3.3 Key policy instruments of MIDP-APDP 
Period Policy Key Policy Instruments 
September 1995-June 
2000 
MIDP Phase 1  Local content regulations abolished. 
Tariff phase-down for imported vehicles. 
Continuation of IEC Scheme.  
 Export credits increased. 
  Implementation of Duty Free Allowance 
(DFA) and small vehicle incentive (SVI) 
July 2000 -December 
2012 
MIDP Phase 2  Tariff phase down until 2012 when tariffs 
reached 25% for vehicles and 20% for 
components.  
 SVI phased down and eventually 
discontinued by 2003.  
 Introduction of new production-based 
DFA. IEC phase-down from 2003. 
  Introduction of productive asset 
allowance (PAA) in 2000.  
Source: Damoense & Simon, 2004 
3.3.1.1 Import duty rates 
The Duty/tariff phase down consisted of the gradual reduction and continuous phase down of 
tariffs for built-up vehicles and components, falling from as high as 65 per cent in the year 
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1995 to 34 per cent by 2005 for built-up vehicles and falling from as high as 49 per cent in 
1995 to 27 per cent for imported components. By 2012, the tariff rate was a mere 25 per cent 
for completely built up units and 20 per cent for components. Table 3.5 below shows the rate 
of phase-down in import tariffs (Flatters and Netshitomboni, 2006). 
Table 3.4 MIDP Tariff Rates (%) 
 
            1995      1996    1997    1998    1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009     2010     2011     2012 
 
Cars    65         61        57.5     54       50.5       47         43.5       40         38        36        34         32          30          29        28          27        26          25 
Part     49         46         43       40       37.5      35          32.5       30         29        28        27         26          25          24        23          22        21          20 
Source: Flatters and Netshitomboni, 2006 
3.3.1.2 The Duty Free Allowance 
The duty free allowance provides import duty reduction in respect of production for the 
domestic and Southern African Customs Union (SACU) market. Under this instrument, a 
duty free allowance was given to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) on imported 
components or completely built up (CBU) vehicles of 27% of the value of the value of 
imports produced for the domestic market. The cost-raising effect of import duties on 
components was offset. The vehicle values for the purpose of the duty free allowance (DFA) 
are based on company specific adjustment factors of produced vehicles (Flatters and 
Netshitomboni, 2006).  
Table 3.5 The Duty Free Allowance 
 
 
                 1995     1996     1997     1998     1999    2000     2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006    2007     2008     2009     2010    2011     2012  
 
DFA (%):  27         27        27         27          27       27          27        27          27         27         27          27       27         27         27         27       27         27 
Source: Flatters (2005) 
To illustrate how the DFA works, suppose an OEM sells 100 vehicles at a wholesale price of 
0f R35 000 each. When applying the DFA of 27%, our calculation becomes:                     
DFA: (100*R35000 = R3500000) * 27% = R945000. This means that the OEM may import 
components worth R945000 duty free (Flatters, 2005). 
3.3.1.3 Small Vehicle Incentive (SVI)  
The Small Vehicle Incentive (SVI) provided higher duty to manufacturers of vehicles with 
lower selling prices. The SVI operated through a duty drawback mechanism, with the value 
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of the duty rebates linked to the affordability of the vehicle (Pitot, 2013).  For every R1 000   
below a wholesale vehicle price of R40 000 the SVI made a provision of 3 per cent to a 
vehicle manufacturer. The aim was to promote the production of much smaller, cheaper and 
more fuel-efficient cars (Damoense, 2004).  
The SVI was phased out in 2002 because of unanticipated result of encouraging few locally 
assembled small cars with very little local content. NACAAM did not support the phasing out 
of the SVI. Instead it advocated for the continuation of this instrument, however, with local 
content requirements, but the authorities disagreed (Pitot, 2013). 
3.3.1.4 Import-Export Complementation Scheme  
This mechanism aims to achieve export expansion into international markets as well as to 
increase volumes of production. Import rebates could be earned for all the exports into 
international markets, which could be used to reduce customs duties of imported vehicles and 
components (Black and Mitchell, 2003). The Import Rebates Credit Certificates were an 
attempt to promote the local content through exports.  The way in which the IEC scheme 
works is to provide vehicle and OEM component exporters the privilege of importing at 
reduced duties. Under this incentive, a vehicle manufacturer exporting vehicles with a local 
content of about R100 million, in the year 2012 for instance, would have the privilege to 
import the same value of vehicles or components duty-free (Flatters, 2002). With a 25% (the 
2012 import duty rate on components) duty on imported vehicles, this would provide a duty 
reduction of R25 million on imported vehicles. This is 25 per cent of the value of the 
domestic content of exports that generated that duty credit. If the exporter were to use the 
credits to import components, the duty reductions amount to 20% (the 2012 import duty rate 
on components) of the value of the domestic content of the exports generating the credit 
(Flatters, 2002). 
3.3.1.5 The Productive Asset Allowance (PAA) 
The Productive Asset Allowance was introduced in 2000 as a fiscal incentive, with the aim to 
support investment in state of the art productive assets. These productive assets may take the 
form of land and buildings, machinery and tooling, plant or capitalised research and 
development (Kaggwa, 2008). The PAA was aimed at contributing towards the goal of global 
competitiveness for the auto sector. This was envisaged to be achieved through the 
rationalisation of vehicle production, and so manufacturers who wanted to benefit from PAA 
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incentives had to effectively reduce the number of models they produce domestically. This 
support instrument encouraged light motor vehicles to import low volume niche products 
instead of producing these models domestically. This would in turn reduce average 
production costs and thereby enhance global competitiveness (Kaggwa, 2008).  
Vehicle manufacturers, both OEMs and component manufacturers who are contracted to 
supply their components to OEMs, had to register with the Department of Trade and Industry 
(Kaggwa, 2008). However, the application, administration, adjudication and rewards under 
the PAA were managed by the International Trade and Administration Commission (ITAC). 
OEMs in the SACU region were given 20% of the value of the investment they made into 
new productive assets, spread over a five year period (Kaggwa, 2008). Component 
manufacturers too, via consenting client OEMs, who were investing in the SACU region were 
provided with 16% for the value of the capitalised productive investment they made. For 
instance, if a vehicle manufacturer was investing R100 million in productive assets, the 
manufacturer would qualify for Import Rebate Certificates (IRCCs) worth R20 million 
(Kaggwa, 2008).  The import rebates would be spread into equal portions of R4 million each 
year for a five year period. If a component manufacturer made the same amount of 
investment, the component manufacturer would qualify to receive IRCCs worth R20 Million 
through a consenting OEM, which would then be obliged to pass on import rebates at least 
worth R16 Million spread over a five year period (Kaggwa, 2008).  
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Chapter 4: Empirical Study - Results and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter firstly evaluates the performance of the MIDP within the parameters of 
employment; investment; trade balance; rationalisation, and vehicle affordability against the 
objectives of the MIDP policy which were highlighted in section 3.3 of chapter 3. The 
discussion then proceeds by following up on the ancillary questions to the research problem 
which are based on Amsdens’ claim that reciprocal control mechanisms (RCMs) strategically 
deployed by the state are the key to successful industrialisation (Amsden, 2001). These 
questions are by and large informed by the critical structuralist insights that emerged in the 
theoretical framework. The ancillary questions are as follows: 
• What form did the cooperation between the state, industry and labour take and what     
implications did this have on the governance of the MIDP? 
• Did the MIDP have reciprocal control mechanisms with the aim of developing a globally 
competitive automotive industry? 
• Did the capability and capacity of the staff tasked with the management and implementation 
of the MIDP match the required industrial policies? 
4.2 Performance Trends of Key Industry Variables under the MIDP 
The MIDP is has been quoted in the National Industrial Policy Framework by the Department 
of Trade and Industry (2007) as an example of a successful industrial policy which carries 
valuable lessons for other industries in South Africa and other developing countries (DTI, 
2007). An unqualified statement on whether or not the MIDP has been successful cannot be 
made without considering the objectives such as employment, investment, rationalisation, 
improvement of the trade balance as well as vehicle affordability which the MIDP set for 
itself.  
4.2.1 Employment 
Employment creation is an important industry variable, particularly in a developing country 
such as South Africa with high unemployment and inequality. Table 4.1 indicates the 
employment trends in the South African auto industry from 1990 to 2012. This includes 
employment figures from the vehicle assembly sector, the components sector and the tyre 
sector. The tyre sector has witnessed significant employment reductions over the period in 
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question. Employment levels in the vehicle assembly sector have remained stagnant between 
1990 and 2012. 
 
NUMSA (2013) holds the view that the MIDP has not had good results in achieving 
employment growth. Instead, the initial objective of employment creation was toned down to 
become a defensive policy with the aim of sustaining employment levels. Despite 
employment levels falling from 38 600 to 32 300 in the OEM sector and from 47 000 to 
38 500 in the components sector, after the first 5 years of the MIDP, Barnes and Black (2003) 
gave a sympathetic interpretation of the employment levels in the auto industry. Flatters 
(2005), on the other hand, has offered a different interpretation by arguing that the alleged 
benefits of the MIDP in terms of employment have been overstated. Flatters (2002) has taken 
the view that the direct cost per job created in the auto industry is very high and has been a 
hindrance to the creation of employment in the vehicle sales, service and maintenance sector 
which has far more capacity for employment creation, but receives no subsidies. On the final 
scorecard of NAACAM (Pitot, 2013) on the MIDP in which the performance of employment 
is stacked up against the objectives of MIDP, the NAACAM renders the MIDP a ‘failure’ 
because of the decline in employment since 1995. The withdrawal of the SVI incentive had 
negative consequences on employment (Pitot, 2013). Despite the disappointing levels of 
employment remaining stagnant during the period of the MIDP, labour productivity in this 
industry has increased from an average of 10 vehicles per worker in 1995 to 18.5 vehicles per 
worker in 2012 (NUMSA, 2013). It is evident that the failure of the MIDP to create 
employment does not reflect the urgency to fight poverty by creating more jobs in this 
industry.  
 
4.2.2 Investment 
There are presently seven OEMs with operations in South Africa, namely Toyota, Nissan, 
BMW, Ford, General Motors, Mercedes and Volkswagen. All of these OEMs produce 
vehicles for the local as well as the international market (AIEC, 2013). Table 4.2 shows that 
for the 5 year period 1990 to 1995, before the implementation of the MIDP, the auto 
industry’s capital expenditure by OEMs moved in a downward direction. In 1994, new 
investments by OEMs had decreased by more than 25% from the 1990 investment levels. 
Within a year after the introduction of MIDP, OEM capital expenditure expanded from R847 
Million in 1995 to R1.171 Million in 1996. From 1995 to the year 2000, the first five years of 
MIDP, there was a steady rise in investments. Upon the introduction of the PAA in the year 
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2000, the auto industry has witnessed an acceleration of an upward trend in investments. By 
2006, within 6 years of the PAA, investments had increased triple fold. The capital 
expenditure decline during 2009 is in part attributable to the global financial and economic 
crisis and the associated instability of various investment projects (NAAMSA, 2010). By 
2010, investments had risen again to 3.99 billion and 4.6 billion in 2012. Table 4.2 shows that 
there have been significant improvements in investment by OEMs suggesting success, 
however, the critical discussion in section 4.3 brings to bear the paradoxical success of the 
MIDP in attracting investments. 
 
4.2.3 Rationalisation  
In the year 2009, the number of light motor vehicles produced in South Africa was 17 
models, a sharp decline from the 42 model platforms that were in operation in 1995 at the 
beginning of the MIDP (Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn, 2007). Reducing the number of models 
reduces the average costs of production, thus contributing to industry competitiveness 
(Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn, 2007). The logic the Duty Free Allowance instrument was to 
enable manufacturers to import at reduced tariffs. This would then allow manufacturers to 
focus and specialise on manufacturing selected models and importing the remainder, thus the 
objective of rationalisation could be achieved. The PAA also played a role in supporting the 
objective of rationalisation (Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn, 2007). Applicants for the PAA 
incentive had to present a business plan which outlines how they plan to contribute to 
rationalisation. Since the introduction of the PAA, the number of platforms decreased from 31 
platforms with an average annual volume of 9500 vehicles per platform down to 18 platforms 
with an average annual volume of 24 500 vehicles per platform in 2004 (Kaggwa, Pouris and 
Steyn, 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, the increase in vehicle production and a reduction in average costs of 
production have been accompanied by a flood of imports. Black (2002) and Black and 
Bhanisi (2007) in Bronkhorst, Steyn and Stiglingh (2013) highlight some criticism against the 
structure of the MIDP for having made it much easier to obtain duty rebates to import 
vehicles than to facilitate rationalisation. Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn (2007) argue that this 
phenomenon leads raises questions as to whether the realisation of the objective of 
rationalisation can truly translate into industry competitiveness. Employees in the automotive 
industry have had to bear the brunt of the reorganisation and rationalisation of the industry. 
Decreasing the number of models and production platforms results in job losses, and is one of 
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the more significant factors in explaining the poor employment levels (NUMSA, 2012; 
Barchiesi, 1997).  
 
4.2.4 Trade balance 
The IEC scheme which functioned as an export subsidy through both imports and exports was 
the main instrument under the MIDP aimed at improving the auto industry trade balance 
(Bronkhorst Steyn and Stiglingh, 2013). In 2012, the total value of exports was R86.8 billion; 
more than twenty fold from the R4.2 billion at the inception of MIDP in 1995. However, on 
the other hand, the total value of imports escalated from R16.4 billion in 1995 to R136 billion 
in 2012. Table 4.3 shows that the trade balance has been in deficit for the whole duration of 
MIDP, starting at R12.2 billion in 1995 and increasing to 49.2 Billion in 2012 (Bronkhorst, 
Steyn and Stiglingh 2013; AIEC, 2013). According to Pitot (2013) the disappearance of 
locally produced small cars, which was a result of the withdrawal of the SVI incentive, led to 
these cars being replaced by a high volume of low-cost imported vehicles. This had a 
negative consequence on the industry’s trade balance. The net effect of the MIDP in general 
and the IEC scheme in particular has been dismal at achieving the objective of improving the 
industry’s trade balance. The overall picture with respect to the auto industry trade balance 
seems to be that, the MIDP has done particularly well in promoting exports, but has also done 
well at encouraging a high volume of imports, an unintended consequence, of which it 
seemed the DTI did not have any mechanisms to control. 
 
4.2.5 Vehicle affordability 
Kaplan (2005) argues that the link between MIDP and vehicle prices in South Africa must not 
be ignored because they have important implications for the poor. According to Pitot (2013) 
the SVI mechanism led to the reduction of small car prices in 1995/1996. In 2003 Barnes, 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2003) found that there was absolutely no evidence to make a 
conclusion that MIDP had resulted in price increases. However, two years later, the findings 
of the earlier study were challenged by a study by Barnes et al (2005) who reached the 
conclusion that prices of vehicles on the low end of the market were considerably higher than 
in the United Kingdom. Further, a study by the Competition Commission validated these 
results by reporting that South African vehicle prices were 14% higher on average than the 
prices of similar vehicles in the European Union (Flatters and Netshitomboni, 2006). 
Surprisingly subsidies to car manufacturers are not borne by taxpayers through the 
government budget, but by vehicle consumers through premium vehicle prices. Flatters and 
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Netshitomboni (2006) argued that cost of the 20% PAA subsidy to car manufacturers is borne 
by local vehicle consumers (Flatters and Netshitomboni, 2006). The IRCC scheme also 
contributed to the high prices of vehicles because vehicle manufacturers are have the 
privilege of importing duty-free and selling at duty-inclusive domestic prices (Flatters and 
Netshitomboni, 2006). The complexity of the manner in which incentives under MIDP were 
given is as such that they make it difficult to see that the subsidies are financed by vehicle 
consumers (Flatters and Netshitomboni, 2006). According to Flatters and Netshitomboni 
(2006) high vehicle prices is a constraint to the already limited domestic market in South 
Africa. They also mean that the social cost to the poor is much higher since the bulk of the 
expenditure of the poor goes into transportation and the high costs of transportation are 
passed on the poor passengers. 
Table 4.1 Employment trends in the South African Automotive Industry: 1990-2012 
YEAR ASSEMBLY COMPONENTS TYRE 
1990 37 845 69 000 N/A 
1991 36 895 65 000 N/A 
1992 38 731 N/A N/A 
1993 37 160 N/A N/A 
1994 37 600 N/A N/A 
1995 38 600 N/A N/A 
1996 38 600 65 000 11 000 
1997 37 100 69 100 10 000 
1998 33 700 69 700 9 100 
1999 32 000 67 200 6 670 
2000 32 300 69 500 6 575 
2001 32 700 72 100 6 300 
2002 32 370 74 100 6 000 
2003 31 700 75 000 7 200 
2004 31 800 74 500 7 200 
2005 34 300 78 000 6 800 
2006 37 900 78 000 6 500 
2007 38 400 81 000 6 900 
2008 36 000 81 500 7 000 
2009 30 100 61 000 6200 
2010 28 128 65 000 6 600 
2011 29000 68000 6500 
2012 30 159 70 000 6700 
Sources: Automotive Year Book, 2009; Stats SA - Motor trade industry 2009; AIEC, 2010; 2011 and 
2013 
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Table 4.2 New Investment/Capital Expenditure 2000-2012 
 
Source: NAAMSA, 2011; 2013 
Table 4.3 Automotive Industry Trade Balance 1995-2012 
  
Year 
Total Exports (R 
Billion) 
Total Imports (R 
Billion)  
Trade Balance (R 
Billion) 
1995 4.2 16.4 -12.4 
1996 5.1 19.2 -14.1 
1997 6.6 17.2 -10.6 
1998 10.1 19.9 -9.8 
1999 14.8 22.8 -8 
2000 20 29.7 -9.8 
2001 30 38 -8 
2002 40 50.2 -10.1 
2003 40.7 49.8 -9.1 
2004 39.2 58 -18.8 
2005 45.3 72.5 -27.2 
2006 54.7 88.5 -33.8 
2007 67.6 102.2 -34.6 
2008 94.2 108.9 -14.7 
2009 61 79.9 -18.9 
2010 69.5 100.2 -30.7 
2011 82.2 120.8 -38.6 
2012 86.9 136.1 -49.2 
Source: AIEC, 2013 
Capital 
Expenditure 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Projection
Product/Local 
Content/Export 
Investment/Prod
uction Facilities
1311.2 1800.1 2311.4 1989.4 1816.3 2805.3 5058.1 2458.7 2807.7 2215.9 3351.1 3522.7 3837.2 4525.5
Land and 
Buildings
109.7 33.3 152 141.5 129.6 512.1 758 382.4 329.1 178.7 441.2 176.4 431.9 301
Support 
Infrastructure: IT, 
R&D, Technical
140.6 244.9 262.4 193.9 273.7 258.7 398.8 254.4 153.1 74.1 202.4 203.6 409.2 393.1
Total 1561.5 2078.3 2725.8 2324.8 2219.6 3576.1 6214.9 3095.5 3289.9 2468.7 3994.7 3902.7 4678.3 5219.6
Millions
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4.3 THE GOVERNANCE OF THE MIDP 
The institutional makeup and configuration of the policy process 
The development of policies for the automotive industry has been forged through a process 
that brings the private sector, labour and the government into dialogue through the motor 
industry development council (MIDC). The MIDC is a platform in which the government, 
business and labour representatives exchange ideas and also serves as a platform for 
negotiation (Hirschsohn, Godrey & Maree, 2000). The major players which influence what 
happens in the automotive industry are NAACAM and NAAMSA, the two motor industry 
associations; NUMSA, the industry trade union; the Retail Motor Industry (RMI) 
organisation, the South African Tyre Manufacturers Conference (SATMC), the Catalytic 
Converter Interest Group (CCIG) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The 
meetings of this council are held every six to eight weeks (Galant, 2005; Hirschsohn, Godrey 
& Maree, 2000). The council also makes recommendations on issues of manufacturing and 
trade legislation, policies governing the local industry, strategies of implementation of policy 
as well as the function of reviewing and commissioning industry relevant research 
(Hirschsohn, Godfrey and Maree, 2000; Galant, 2005). With the help of customs officials at 
the industrial trade administration commission (ITAC) and the South African revenue service 
(SARS), the DTI administered and coordinated the motor industry development programme 
(MIDP) and also made the ultimate decisions pertaining to the direction of industrial policy 
(interview with Mkululi Mlota). In summary, the intention of how the MIDC was supposed to 
function in this inclusive and structured process the distribution of responsibilities for 
solutions, facilitate the process where the public and private sector learn from each other, the 
facilitation of negotiations and the evaluation of outcomes with respect to the instruments of 
the MIDP. However, this institutional arrangement proved to be a great challenge since the 
underlying policies such as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
programme, the Reconstruction and Development Programme as well as the Industrial 
Strategy Project (ISP) considerably weakened the legitimacy of the state to enforce reciprocal 
control mechanisms on industry which enjoyed subsidisation and protection without having a 
serious intention to develop a vibrant domestic automotive industry with significant 
propensities for employment. 
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OEMs in the driver’s seat: the pre-eminence of OEMs in governing policy direction  
The initial intention of the MIDP was to develop a vibrant domestic components value chain, 
because that was the sector that the DTI had identified as having the potential for the increase 
in employment and creation of new jobs. To do this, the policy had to find a way to work with 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), who had and still continue to maintain 
considerable power in the value chain. The more important but challenging task was to graft 
in the domestic component suppliers, which have always been in a much weaker position, 
into the supply-demand relationship with OEMs (Zavareh Rustomjee, interview). The 
relations that exist in the South African automotive industry are tricky and not easy to manage 
as there is often a divergence of views with respect to the policies and strategies to be 
adopted. However, the direction of policy is focused around the plans and ambitions of 
OEMs, and other stakeholders follow suit. Consequently, OEMs have enjoyed more 
privileges and transfers of rents in their direction (Robert, Houdet, interview). The 
components sector, on the other hand, where much of the critically important learning-by-
doing which is needed for acquiring tacit knowledge, as Khan (2009) argues, has been 
relatively neglected and not received the kind of support that would that would substantially 
improve its competitiveness. The detrimental effects of this unequal treatment have been felt 
downstream in the lower tiers of the components sector which consist of emerging suppliers. 
Although the components sector has experienced growth, it has come under pressure with the 
catalytic converter sector being one of the key sectors facing an uncertain future, despite the 
protection is has received (Robert Houdet, interview). 
Wrong gear start in moving towards learning: The South African components sector 
At the time of the inception of the MIDP, the nature of the components was relatively 
unsophisticated with catalytic converters and leather seats being the main focus. The catalytic 
converter sector was not the most viable of components to incentivise at such high levels in 
the first place because what goes into the catalytic converter is mostly platinum. There is only 
so much value that can be added in the production of a catalytic converter besides the 
substrate manufacturing. With catalytic converters, industry is exporting platinum that would 
have been exported in any case. Instead, higher value-added activities in sustainable value 
chains such as engine production ought to have been invested into because experience has 
proven that competitiveness really lies is in the more sophisticated components (Zavareh 
Rustomjee, interview). Robert Houdet in Venter (2014) suggests that the solution for raising 
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the global competitiveness of the catalytic convertor sector lies in the introduction of a 
production tax on all platinum group metals (PGMs) produced in the country as this measure 
would serve as an incentive to manufacture catalytic converters in South Africa. From this it 
is evident that there is no way that the competitiveness of the catalytic converter sector (and 
other raw material sectors such as leather and tyres) can be improved without the perpetual 
support of government subsidies. In the mid-term review of the MIDP in 1999 the DTI 
contemplated on whether to target more sophisticated components such as engine fittings for 
export or to stick to the subsidisation of catalytic converters and leather. The decision, which 
was influenced by the then Minister of Trade and Industry Alec Erwin, was to take a more 
“careful approach” rather than to push OEMs and component manufacturers into deepening 
their value chain involvement into higher value-added activities (Zavareh, Rustomjee, 
interview). This “careful approach” strategy adopted by Alec Erwin, of following competitive 
advantages instead of defying them and building new competitive advantages, is an example 
of the neoliberal economic policy strategies of the Washington Consensus adopted in South 
Africa in the 1990’s. The lack of a vision by the government resulted in it being influenced by 
the preferences of industry at the expense of industrial policies that are geared towards 
learning.  
The power of foreign automotive firms over the state and organised labour 
In section 4.2.1 it was shown that the employment levels particularly in the assembly sector 
have shown no improvement in the 17 years of the existence of MIDP. This shortcoming 
suggests that the MIDP was not sensitive to employment outcomes. The MIDP did not 
condition support on employment creation to beneficiaries of government support were not 
tied to conditional support relating to economic development and in such a way as to generate 
the desired results in accordance to the governments set policy objectives (Sydney Mufamadi, 
interview). The potential for conflict between NUMSA and business meant that the 
negotiation and bargaining around labour issues did not take place at MIDC. In the process of 
developing an institutional design that satisfies OEMs, labour issues did not form part of 
MIDC negotiations (Hirschonson, Godfrey and Marre, 2000). This negation of wage and 
employment negotiations in MIDC meant that there was less risk of the framework collapsing 
because of the potential conflict between unions and industry (Hirschsohn, Godfrey and 
Maree, 2000). However, as argued and shown in table 4.1, the retreat of policy from an 
objective of creating employment to a defensive position of ensuring employment stability 
has meant that developmental and social objectives have not been met. The institutional 
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configuration gave OEMs the upper hand in bargaining and negotiation power vis-à-vis 
organised labour, government and suppliers. The demands of OEMs which rule out any 
progressive reforms in labour policies have been prioritized and met. However, organised 
labour has been limited in the articulation of labour policies that promote job creation and 
protect workers. The political strength of South African trade unions and their ability to 
weight the countries job creation choices have been unengaged (Sydney Mufamadi, 
interview).  
The legitimisation of neo-liberal policies in the automotive industry 
NUMSA, through the National Bargaining Forum (NBF) was responsible for providing a 
vision and strategy of the assembly sector’s human resource strategy, monitoring training 
implementation, pushing for massive investment in training required for global 
competitiveness and the promotion of learning so that workers can keep up with technological 
change (Hirschsohn, Godfrey and Maree, 2000). NUMSA put in place stringent requirements 
and thus had the enormous task of monitoring training implementation. Hirschsohn, Godfrey 
and Maree (2000) argue that industry and labour often reached consensus on the demands of 
NUMSA and on performance benchmarks for OEMs to developing human resources. 
However, it is also true that at times NUMSA failed to secure precise financial commitments 
from auto industry firms as there was often a divergence and tensions with respect to the 
strategic choices of the two parties with regards to the direction which learning should take 
(Hirschsohn, Godfrey and Maree, 2000).  
Hirschsohn, Godfrey and Maree (2000) also argue that much which stood to be gained from 
the organisational power of labour was lost from the beginning because “the social partners 
(NUMSA) were neither “social” nor “partners” in their modus operandi. Hirschsohn, Godfrey 
and Maree (2000) argue that “instead of wielding power against the state and employers from 
outside, the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and (NUMSA) shifted 
strategy and pursued its ambitious agenda for social and economic transformation by 
demanding and securing an institutional role in tripartite policy-making to exercise influence 
from within the power structure”. This move towards corporatism, as Desai and Habib 
(argue) in the South African automotive has resulted in NUMSA being given the opportunity 
to participate in a limited way in shaping policies of the MIDP in the MIDC in exchange for 
restricting its demands and operating within agreed parameters (Desai and Habib, 1997). The 
Industrial Strategy Project and its flexible-specification (flec-spec) approach which 
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influenced the automotive industry policy is an expression of these corporatist strategies 
(Desai and Habib, 1997; Fine, 1995). The Corporatism in the automotive industry in South 
Africa reflects the interests of OEMs and does not seek to address and promote labour 
interests (Desai and Habib, 1997; Fine, 1995). The neo-liberal policies embraced by the ANC 
government have circumscribed the political power of NUMSA, and NUMSA has entered 
into compromises with OEMs at the level of national agreements that are decidedly in favour 
of OEMs at the expense of learning at the plant level (Desai and Habib, 1997).  
 
Synthesis 
It turns out that the real question is not whether the MIDP has been a success, rather the 
question should be: for whom has it been a success? The mere fact that employment has 
decreased or somewhat remained static over the life of MIDP is a testament to the fact that 
there has been little gain for labour. However, one must by counterfactual reasoning pose the 
question of whether South Africa would be having the same levels of employment that exist 
today without MIDP. Those sympathetic of the MIDP have argued that such levels of 
employment might not have been sustained without the MIDP (Black, 2002). However, that 
being said, based on the structural approach outlined in the theoretical framework, one would 
expect that an increase in production and exports would correlate with an increase in 
employment. This has not been the case. Increases in exports and production which are 
unaccompanied by improvements in employment and increased local content of domestically 
produced surely do not constitute success in the context of development. What is true is that 
as shown in table 4.1 , between 1990 and 2012, employment has on the average decreased in 
the assembly and tyre sector (between 1996 and 2012) whilst in the components sector it has 
been stagnant. Black and Mitchel (2003) argue that there are significant rents transferred to 
the automotive industry, however they are silent on whether these rents are productive or 
unproductive. This tells us that the rents towards the automotive industry have been generally 
unproductive in achieving employment creation, not to mention the stated goal of maintaining 
employment. The limited extent to which the benefits are socialised, the lack of 
diversification, the unsatisfactory job creation and the non-competitiveness enhancing nature 
of investments made by OEMs and the limited extent with which they have facilitated the 
competitiveness of the component manufactures competitive do not arguably warrant the 
generous incentives, subsidies and biased support towards their demands over and above the 
crucial domestic components sector. The MIDP arrangement was managed in a way that was 
too controlled by OEMs and not enough by government. All this gave OEMs enough room to 
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secure their demands, but limited NUMSA in the ability to negotiate and leverage state power 
in favour of labour. It is clear that the mechanisms used in MIDP are not appropriate to 
improve the bargaining strength of trade unions. What is critically important is that the both 
the state and organised labour have a shared understanding that they are locked into a 
relationship of collaboration with the private sector and their manoeuvres and mechanisms 
used must compatibly fit into a strategic mosaic which will maximise developmental benefits 
in their favour. The balance of power can only be shifted through functional reciprocal 
control mechanisms which enforce certain conditions so that OEMs can make progressive 
compromises towards development. 
 
4.4 RECIPROCAL CONTROL MECHANISMS IN THE MIDP 
Introduction 
In a section of the National Industrial Policy Framework (2007:54), which is dedicated to the 
appraisal of South Africa’s post-apartheid industrial policies, the MIDP is highlighted as one 
of the key successes. It is noted that “although the MIDP, is not directly replicable to other 
sectors, the principle of the reciprocal control mechanism (emphasis added) through which it 
worked does have lessons for other interventions”. In chapter 4, the discussion in part focused 
on the number of incentives under the MIDP. However given its objectives, which at face 
value could typically be subject to an RCM, the PAA has been identified in this study as a 
key instrument to validate the presence of RCMs. The other reason for focusing on the PAA 
scheme is because a similar scheme exists under the APDP, the Automotive Investment 
Scheme. The implications arising from the analysis of the PAA has useful insights for 
specific policy levers that could be utilised to direct state support towards long-term industry 
competitiveness. 
The Reciprocal Control Mechanism of the PAA Scheme 
Applicants, under the PAA had to show that their investment in productive assets would 
contribute towards promoting MIDP objectives. Applicants had to submit a five-year business 
plan which outlines an investment schedule, employment, marketing, supplier and production 
plans as well as financial projections. Manufacturers who submitted applications with 
inadequate projected performance were turned down by ITAC upon evaluation. For an 
application to be successful, it had to have an unqualified external auditors’ report on the 
investment and an engineers’ report that ascertained that the investment had indeed taken 
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place before certificates are issued to him. If it is found that there are significant performance 
deviations (more than 10%) from the initial application submission then the subsequent 
issuing of import rebates was terminated (Kaggwa, Pouris and Steyn, 2007).  
In the analysis of the PAA we need to pay close attention to the type and nature of 
investments attracted under MIDP because they have a significant bearing on the trajectory of 
learning and industry competitiveness. The nature of the automotive industry in South Africa 
is one that largely depends on the foreign investments made by OEMs and therefore it is fair 
to make the case that the competitiveness of this industry, to a large degree, rests on these 
foreign direct investments. However, what is more important, according to Khan (2009), is 
that OEM investments transfer learning capacity to the local economy. If we place a 
quantitative measure on OEM investments in South Africa, we see an impressive upward 
trend as evidenced by the more than twofold expansion of investments within just 4 years of 
the introduction of the PAA. However, upon further probing, it becomes evident that the 
types of investments which correspond to developing national capabilities at critical levels of 
the value-chain have been minimal (Mkululi Mlota, interview). The bulk of investments have 
been concentrated towards plant, machinery, tooling, land and buildings accounting for more 
than 90% of the total annual investments of OEMs. Investment in R&D emanating from PAA 
was less than 10% of total investment expenditure (Table 4.2). The problem that might arise 
in such a situation, as Khan (2009) has argued is that if OEMs receive rents like they already 
do, but do not invest in improving domestic manufacturing capabilities and competencies, 
they might relocate in the future to locations where there are high level technological 
operations. 
Principal Factors Underpinning the Gaps: Lack of Monitoring and Enforcement  
There are a number of factors that limit the range of instruments that are available to the state 
to impose performance requirements and targets on OEMs. An empirical vindication, through 
interviews, has given to a better understanding of why, in spite of the presence of formal 
RCMs, there was in fact a lack of monitoring and enforcement. 
What is critically important in the design of industrial policy is that it should embody 
structural monitoring and feedback mechanisms (Kaplan, 2007). However, very few 
industrial policy programmes in South Africa have made for provision for monitoring and 
evaluation (Kaplan, 2007). Despite elements of monitoring in the MIDP, the incentives 
provided, however, are not as rigorously monitored and managed in comparison to other 
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incentives programmes such as the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Programme 
(SMEDP), the Support Programme for Industrial Innovation (SPII) and the Sector Partnership 
Fund (SPF) (Rustomjee & Hanival, 2010:52). The MIDP does not have the specific cost-
benefit tracking systems that allow the state to effectively manage the rents in accordance 
with the structuralist conception of state intervention. This is possibly why the data on the 
quantum of financial resources that were allocated to incentive recipients under MIDP is not 
easily available. This, as will be argued in section 4.5 below, raises doubts and questions on 
the capacity and capability of the responsible agents who managed MIDP instruments. 
Kaggwa (2008:87) argues that “the offer of investment incentives to the South African 
automotive industry…is a feedback problem”. The largely unaccounted for feedback 
mechanisms have contributed to the unintended and unsatisfactory consequences such as the 
deterioration of trade balance, an escalation of imports, static employment, decline in local 
content etc. as was shown in the presentation of the performance of key industry variables in 
section 4.2. The feedback mechanisms that Amsden was so well aware of were not a reality in 
the MIDP. For Amsden, “feedback” was very central and critical to her conception of control 
(Kapadia, 2012).
2
 The government simply did not “watch and see” (Kaggwa, 2008) whether 
the investments where improving the manufacturing competencies and capabilities for 
learning in the automotive industry. The impropriety in the direction of policy, in the words 
of Amsden, was not “sensed and assessed” and therefore could not be fed-back into policy 
reorientation.  
The OEMs effectively made their own investment, export, local content, and employment 
target choices (Rustomjee and Hanival, 2010). However, the scope of investments that could 
benefit under the PAA scheme for instance, was so wide that all sorts of investments were 
welcomed as contributing to industry competitiveness as well as improving domestic 
manufacturing capabilities and competencies. This meant that investor firms could decide on 
their own accord which investments and what form they could undertake. The PAA was 
badly targeted to the extent that firms dedicated a significant portion to less technological 
investments that yield quicker short-term returns and forsook R&D activities which yield 
long term competitiveness (Kaggwa, 2008). The formulation of the MIDP, despite being a 
consultative process between the government, industry and labour put less emphasis on how 
incentives were to lead to industry competitiveness in the long term. As a result, monitoring, 
                                                          
2
 Amsden’s own definition of a control mechanism is “a set of institutions that discipline economic behaviour 
based on a feedback of information that has been sensed and assessed” (Amsden, 2005:27). 
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feedback, control and the principle of reciprocity within the industry have received little 
attention in the management and implementation of the programme. These factors, however, 
are critical in understanding industry performance. The government’s reciprocal control 
mechanisms were not robust enough to get the job done of developing and deepening 
developmental relationship with OEMs. This reflects the hands-off approach by government 
and its inability to impose conditionalities on OEMs’ investment decisions towards learning 
and competitiveness. 
Centralisation of R&D Activities 
It is clear that under the PAA the attraction of investments was not geared towards the 
promotion of learning through research and development activities which bears the fruits of 
innovation and technological upgrading and ultimately the realisation of global 
competitiveness objective. Much of the valuable activities for learning and transfer of 
manufacturing competencies are not taking place at a desirable pace in South Africa. The 
R&D elements which involve high skilled employment and require a fairly decent amount of 
training happen at parent OEM countries. For instance, although American original 
equipment manufacturing companies have a few satellite facilities in other parts of the world, 
they are generally adamant that most of their R&D is done and remains in America.  At most 
the DTI almost always only has influence at assembly level, except for when R&D generally 
takes place in South Africa because some of the components and technologies need to be 
adapted to suit local conditions. There are a few cases where some small modifications in 
terms of heat testing takes place around Upington. The Ford Bantam, for instance, is a Bakkie 
customised from a passenger vehicle. The local Ford plant was involved in adapting and 
homo locating it as a Bakkie because of the popularity of this type of vehicle in South Africa. 
So then, from time to time you find that such kinds of R&D activities occurred, but not the 
sort of original R&D that promotes learning-by-doing and that would really give South Africa 
a cutting-edge competitiveness. 
The views expressed by Mkululi Mlota (interview) are in conformity with Gastrow, Kruss, 
Muller & Roodt (2011: 97) who argue that the German MNEs are more or less reluctant to 
move R&D activities out of their country. The “skills availability in the home country is 
sufficient to support the core R&D functions of the firm, usually located in proximity to 
headquarters” (Gastrow et al, 2011: 98). In the case of South Africa, the strategic reasons for 
retaining R&D in Germany (centralized control, proximity to customers, lower co-ordination 
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costs) outweigh the benefits of allocating R&D to the subsidiary (lower labour costs, 
adaptation capabilities for local markets) – with some exceptions. This leaves limited process 
innovation and niche areas of product innovation for local market design and adaptation in 
the hands of the South African subsidiaries (Gatrow et al, 2011: 100).  
Resource Constraints: The Contested Terrain for R&D Investments amongst Host Countries 
The other limitation on attracting R&D investments with high propensity for innovation, 
technological upgrading and competitiveness is a function of limited resources for the South 
African government. Host manufacturing countries are in the competitive race to attract such 
investments. There are huge sums of money poured in attracting auto manufacturing 
investment everywhere around the globe because of the prestige and the privileges this 
industry has to bring (Mkululi Mlota, interview). The competition amongst countries is quite 
a contested terrain
3
. Limited resources for allocation towards industrial policy have meant 
that South Africa has performed dismally in this regard, whilst countries such as Brazil and 
India have been able to acquire and build technological and innovative capabilities through 
various government incentives to promote the localisation and enlarging of R&D mandates 
(Quadros and Consoni, 2009). For instance Gastrow et al (2011: 100) argues that “the Indian 
market offers sufficient incentives to MNCs for them to allocate R&D activities to their 
subsidiaries in the country: a plentiful supply of skills and a large and growing market”. This 
has resulted in an unprecedented learning process for these countries; amongst these 
developing countries. It is clear that in the contested and competitive terrain where countries 
are in the race to attract investments to their shores, the incentives under the MIDP have not 
been an adequate “sweetener” to induce OEMS to in R&D activities. This is despite the fact 
that critics such as Flatters (2002) and (2003) have argued that the net costs of MIDP, which 
have far outstripped the benefits, have accrued as super-profits to OEMs.  
Synthesis 
A similar form of criticism that Amsden (2001:27) points out against the Board of 
Investments in Thailand, can be levelled against the DTI’s PAA scheme. Like the BOI, the 
DTI was “too generous in allocating benefits”. Like the BOI, it can also be argued that the 
DTI “has been extremely promiscuous in giving away promotion credits” which are 
                                                          
3
 For instance, the UK has recently come up with a new scheme to encourage R&D in Britain wherein they say, 
for every pound invested by industry, a pound will reward back to industry in the form of a cash grant (Mkululi 
Mlota, interview) 
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equivalent to the duty credits in the MIDP. The DTI has never seriously asked the question: 
what type of investments and manufacturing capabilities are we really targeting. As Amsden 
(2001:27) points out in the case of the Thailand BOI, so too can it be argued for the DTI that 
“like a woman out on a shopping spree….it issued out promotion certificates (duty credits in 
the case of MIDP)…regardless of the actual intentions of those who asked for and got 
promotion certificates “(MIDP duty credits). It is worth noting however, the factors such as 
the centralisation of R&D activities in developed countries as well as the contested terrain for 
the attraction of investments by countries that host manufacturing operations has had an 
influence of the ability to deploy RCMs.  
4.5 STATE CAPACITY AND THE MIDP 
Introduction 
This section in part aims to show how the challenges highlighted above could be overcome 
with a strong state capacity which is underpinned by a structuralist understanding of industrial 
policy rather than the neo-liberal policies which have proved ineffective for the South African 
economy. Poon (2009) argues that the instruments in China were not perfectly designed as 
other East Asian countries; however what was critically important was an equipped cadre of 
civil servants whose understanding was consistent with industrialisation. The manner in 
which these tools were implemented and monitored in tuning state support, demonstrated 
economic performance and development (poon, 2009). The question for the South African 
automotive industry whether the custodians of industrial policy, the DTI has an understanding 
of the type of industrial policy which is consistent with the state intervention measures and 
policies of the East Asian newly industrialising countries which are worth emulation. 
Neo-liberal strategies of development  
With the new ANC government in power in the 1990’s, the Department of trade and Industry 
inherited the deficiencies of the apartheid regime where it was not structured as a think-tank 
to develop industrial polices and the civil servants within the sector directorates were 
inexperienced in developing industrial policies (Hirschsohn, Godfrey and Maree, 2000). As a 
result the absence of a strong in-house research unit limited the DTI in clearly articulating an 
industrial policy (Rahad, 2007). This led to the former Minister of Trade, Alec Erwin to bring 
together economists from the Economic Trends research group as well as the Industrial 
Strategy project to provide policy advice and formulate strategies for industrial development 
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(Padayachee and Sherbut, 2007). These economists were aware of the difficulties in 
developing a radical and viable agenda for the midst of globalisation and free-market 
hegemony (Desai and Habib, 1997). However, they embraced the neo-liberal economic 
philosophy of the ANC-led government as well as policy options advanced by the World 
Bank (Padayachee and Sherbut, 2007). In formulation of its industrial policy in general and 
that for the automotive industry in particular, the DTI was seduced by the ISP’s narrowly 
conceived flexible-specification (flec-spec) strategies, which have already been discussed in 
the theoretical framework as inappropriate for the South African economy. This has resulted 
in the adoption of policies that have been influenced by narrowly focused neoclassical 
theories and Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus strategies. This 
dominance of neo-liberal thinking goes a long way in explaining the entrenched weaknesses 
of policies such as the MIDP which have been primarily influenced by the Industrial Strategy 
Project.   
Although the DTI has had progressive economists such as Zavareh Rustomjee
4
, the 
challenges still remain. Rashad (2007) argues that the ability of the DTI to sustain capacity in 
making strategic decisions is hampered by a high staff turnover as well as the inability to 
attract civil servants with an understanding which is consistent with structuralist approaches 
to industrialisation. Rustomjee and Hanival (2010:53) argue that “in the case of MIDP, the 
only levers that allow industrial policy targets are in the tariff phase down rates”. The MIDP 
was voluntary and therefore was “self-managed in a sense” (Zavareh Rustomjee, interview). 
So what this means generally is that with a higher local content and higher volume and value 
of exports firms get a better value and reward. The DTI had hoped that OEMs would behave 
in a manner that would increase local content (Mkululi Mlota, interview). The pro-active 
choice of South Africa to follow WTO rules meant that local content targets were not 
specified. However, despite the WTO being an impediment to national developmental 
strategies countries such as Brazil carry on to impose local content targets However, the 
rejection of local content polices which would assist in building the components reflects a 
light touch state intervention approach in the MIDP which is not robust enough to raise the 
competitiveness of the automotive industry.  
 
 
                                                          
4
 Who at one point attempted to influence the strategy of the automotive industry towards building new 
competitive advantages, but the neo-liberal polices favoured by Alec Erwin prevailed (Zavareh Rustomjee, 
interview) 
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Stunted Government Learning  
The monitoring of the implementation MIDP was assigned to consultants such as Anthony 
Black. This meant that internal staff at the DTI was not exposed to the “monitoring and 
evaluation with the objective of learning from experience, an integral part to enabling 
governmental capacities to grow with experience – a version of learning-by-doing” Kaplan 
(2007:108). This internal function allows the staff within to enhance and develop and put the 
government in a better position to advance more effective and adventurous industrial policies. 
The limited capacity of the DTI is also implied by the fact that previous employees in the 
automotive sector directorate, who possibly had left with their expertise, on a number of 
occasions had to be invited to monitor and evaluate the progress and performance of the 
outcomes against the objectives of the policy (Interview with Mlota). Mkululi Mlota 
(interview) concedes that “so whether we had adequate capacity internally, in terms of 
numbers one would say we did not have adequate capacity and hence the appointment of such 
consultants assisted with these huge tasks and projects”. However, the DTI capacity was not 
only limited in numbers but also in its inability to take implement the kind of policies 
required for an industrial policy comparable to East Asia.  
 
Governmental capture is more prone when government capacities are weak. According to 
Mkululi Mlota (Interview), independent consultants would be appointed facilitate the 
monitoring process with the idea that the process would be objective and would encourage 
free participation by all involved without any kind of uneasiness with regards to information 
that would be shared. Flatters (2005) argues that the current and the MIDP reviews have been 
conducted by persons who have been closely connected with the industry and/or the 
management of the program at the DTI. While this experience provides the consultants with 
considerable inside knowledge of the program and the industry, it also raises questions about 
their independence and their own interests in the outcome of the reviews and posed serious 
threats to the autonomy of the state. The DTI does not seem to understand that consultants are 
not colleagues. The problem with this is that these consultants were also at the same time 
consulting for the private sector. The DTI seems to have been under the overwhelming 
pressure of OEMs which led them to give into the demands of these OEMs. The cosy 
relationship cultivated with the OEMs and the industry associations resulted in some degree 
of governmental capture, rent seeking and the creation of non-developmental learning rents as 
already alluded to in Chapter 2.  
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A Limited Understanding of Power Relations  
The threat of disinvestment by OEMs is a serious risk which is confirmed by threat made by 
BMW in 2013 to pull the plug of their investments and engagements from South African 
shores. Practitioners of state craft in the field of industrial policy and development ought to 
know that there are sunk costs which make it difficult for an investor to leave (Sydney 
Mufadi, interview). Notwithstanding this, OEMs might wield more power at one moment 
than at another. What dictates the amount of power is a matter of how the political economic 
environment evolves. The balance of power is not static; it shifts depending on movements of 
many factors at any given point in time. Mostly, state officials are unable to read the political 
economy moments and tactically manoeuvre and negotiate on behalf of the state. There are 
times when it becomes possible for the state (or trade unions) to demand BMW to pay a 
training levy to train workers, but there are times when can BMW refuse to enter into 
compromises with the state or organised labour. A fixed and blanket approach framework 
such as the MIDP and APDP locks out corruption for the most part. However, it does not 
allow the officials who implement and manage the policy to monitor and to ‘read the 
moment’ and therefore respond by using its discretion to implement measures such as that of 
the industrial development bureau (IDB). This means that part of necessary feedback into 
policy reorientation and the swift discretion to effectively draw on a range of industrial policy 
levers at the state’s disposal, like the sharp IDB economic engineers in Taiwan, is quickly 
closed. 
 
Synthesis 
In the final analysis, the nature of neo-liberal polices which have in fact influenced the policy 
of the South African automotive industry have promoted strategies which are aligned with 
South Africa’s natural competitive advantages such as catalytic converters and leather seat 
kits, which have not demonstrated a move towards international competitiveness. The MIDP 
has failed to build new competitive advantages in more sophisticated components with a 
sustainable value-chain. All of the interviewed agree on the fact that there is no doubt that 
OEMs wield a lot of power in the automotive value chain, both globally and in South Africa. 
Their voice seems to have weight more than the suppliers, trade unions and even the state. 
State officials (and trade unionists) are well equipped to negotiate on an equal footing with 
OEMs at a strategic level. The improvement in state capacity with an understanding of the 
allocation of rents with the growth of jobs, learning and development in mind in the areas of 
industrial policy is important for industrial development. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter concludes the investigation and reflects on how this study has been empirically 
vindicated through interviews. The recommendations for future research as well as the policy 
implications of this study are also given. A review of the industrial policy framework has set 
the scene for this research by primarily highlighting the differences in economic and 
development literature on their position and approach in the study of industrial policy. 
However, it also served to show how unimpressive neoclassical orthodox approaches to 
industrial policy when stacked up against the structuralist approach to industrial policy. The 
structuralist stance, on which the hypothesis of this study is premised upon, was advanced to 
show that industrial policy, with a strong state intervention in the economy, can be used as a 
mechanism for systemic industrialisation and development. Infant industries in developing 
countries need to be protected until such time that they are mature and globally competitive 
(List, 1856). In the meanwhile, the creation and transfer of learning rents accelerates learning-
by-doing in these infant industries (Khan, 2009). However, because of the inherent dangers of 
bad unproductive rents, these rents need to be managed through a set of reciprocal control 
mechanisms (RCMs) (Amsden, 2001).  In turn, the effective management and enforcement of 
RCMs requires strong state capacities to do so (Wade, 2010). 
Industrialisation in South Africa, as it was shown in chapter 2, can be understood in the 
context if three distinct phases. The first phase under the apartheid regime was characterised 
by a ‘minerals-energy complex’ system of accumulation which failed to develop coherent 
polices for industrialisation (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). The automotive industrial policies 
created an inward-oriented, fragmented and inefficient automotive industry (Black, 2001). 
The position of South Africa ahead of its East Asian counterparts such as South Korea in 
terms of automotive vehicle production was reversed and countries like South Korea took a 
giant leap with their impressive structuralist industrial policies and became world leaders in 
the global automotive industry (Chang, 1998). Under the post-apartheid era, which was swept 
by the neoliberal embrace of Washington Consensus-type policies, the influence of 
neoclassical thinking on the automotive industrial polices was pronounced with the adoption 
of supply-side measures, rejection of demand-side measure and the adoption of flexible 
specialisation and corporatism in the automotive industry (Fine, 1995; Desai and Habib, 
1997). In 2007, the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) and the introduction of the 
Industrial Policy Action Plan, 2007 were introduced on the mediated need for a structural 
analysis of the South African economy and industrialisation, and therefore one can only hope 
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that the direction of industrial policy will shift towards the direction of a structuralist 
understanding of industrialisation as per the importance of this approach in the theoretical 
framework.  
 Although the South African automotive industry is engaged with a negligible automotive 
production in comparison to other countries, there is no doubt about the importance of this 
industry for the South African economy. However, it remains under pressure with the 
challenge of having to keep up with global competitiveness as the globally integrated nature 
of this industry, which is dominated by few Original Equipment Manufacturers. The MIDP 
was introduced in 1995. With the objective of achieving global competitiveness, stabilising 
employment, increase exports, attracting foreign direct investments, rationalisation of vehicle 
production and improving the automotive industry trade balance. Instruments such as the duty 
free allowance, small vehicle incentive, import-export complementation scheme and 
production asset allowance were deployed to achieve this. However, these instruments were 
skewed in favour of supporting original equipment manufacturers and certain tools were not 
made available to the components manufacturing industry which is crucial for building a 
domestic automotive industry. The rejection of prescribed minimum local content 
programmes, which are still being engaged by countries such as Brazil (Mkululi Mlota, 
interview) and the complete shift in ownership of the industry to foreign OEMs has made it 
difficult for the domestic components industry (Poon, 2009). 
The principal question that this study has attempted to answer is: was the MIDP successful in 
reshaping the different prevailing interest of the different economic and political economy 
actors towards learning? In assessing the MIDP on this basis, can we say that it makes a 
successful economic development policy? Firstly, this research has shown that if we assess 
the success of the MIDP on the basis of its objectives, the policy has not been successful. The 
MIDP has facilitated an impressive growth in exports, production, investments and 
profitability in the automotive sector. However, even this apparent ‘success’ has come at high 
levels of subsidisation of OEMs with limited reciprocal commitments from their side. A 
dismal performance has been witnessed in the areas of job creation, industry trade balance, 
vehicle affordability and investments that promote learning.  The research has succeeded to 
answer the research question, and has met the objectives of this study. The findings, which 
are consistent with the hypothesis, help to explain the disappointing results with respect to 
employment creation, development of a domestic components supplier industry as well as the 
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attraction of competiveness-enhancing projects and R&D investments which lead to industry 
competitiveness and learning. 
The findings are can be summarised as follows: 
Firstly, the state-labour-industry institutional arrangement, which is underpinned by the shift 
to a corporatist settlement at the time of implementation of the MIDP and influences of the 
flexible speculation (flec-spec) theory have entrenched the considerable power of OEMs in 
the South African automotive value chain, whilst the political power of NUMSA has been 
circumscribed. This resulted in NUMSA entering into agreements with OEMs that are 
decidedly in favour of OEMs at the expense of learning-by-doing at the firm and plant level. 
OEMs demands for rationalisation of production, which have resulted in mass retrenchments 
in the assembly sector, have been prioritised at the expense and marginalisation of 
employment creation. 
Secondly, in spite of the presence of reciprocal control mechanisms in instruments such as the 
Productive Asset Allowance (PAA), there was in fact a lack of monitoring of performance 
and enforcement of RCMs. OEMs found ways to manoeuvre around the policy so that they 
could make less technological investments that yield short-term returns at the expense of the 
sorts of investments that would improve domestic manufacturing capabilities and 
competencies. The centralisation of learning takes place at the countries of origin of the 
OEMs. The MIDP policy did not have robust policy levers such as in India and Brazil to 
attract the type of manufacturing technologies that contribute the most to improving 
competitiveness. The DTI did not ask the question: what type of investments and 
manufacturing competencies are we really targeting? 
Thirdly and finally, the DTI adopted ‘careful approaches’ to developing  domestic component 
suppliers by following natural comparative advantages instead of building new competitive 
advantages that are consistent with the competitiveness pressures of the global automotive 
environment. These ‘careful approach’ strategies of former Minister Alec Erwin find their 
expression in the neo-liberal economic and industrial policy approaches that prevailed at the 
time. The DTI did not have the type of state capacity that is consistent with the state 
intervention measures and policies that were deployed by the East Asian newly industrialising 
countries. The dominance of neo-liberal thinking, such as the government lowering the tariffs 
schedule of the MIDP more aggressively than what was required by the WTO reflects the 
absence of the muscle and will to deploy these instruments. The outsourcing of monitoring to 
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private consultants did not enable governmental capacities to grow with experience, which is 
a version of learning-by-doing.  
There are a number of policy recommendations that arise from this study. For the APDP, the 
successor of the MIDP, a higher impact industrial policy which creates developmental 
alliances between the state, labour and industry; that is underpinned by reciprocal control 
mechanisms, and a strong state capacity that understands the need to subsidies industry to 
promote exports, enhance local content, improve efficiency, production and profitability, 
whilst at the same time subjecting the automotive industry to discipline and effective 
monitoring is needed. The creation and allocation of productive rents that accelerate industrial 
and technological learning is possible with a better equipped bureaucracy with more funds 
could perhaps install a more robustly ‘nuanced’ set of support measures. The government 
must be able to subsidise firms and not only those that have the guarantee to succeed. 
However, it cannot do so unconditionally. The state must set and enforce targets to be met. 
The idea that subsidies and incentives coming out of national income can be taken for granted 
or become give-aways should be eliminated through discipline.  
The structuralist approach to state intervention, it has been argued offers an adequate 
understanding to the analysis of industrial policy. Recommendations for future research 
would include an investigation on the extent to which the APDP is aligned to the structural 
analysis of the economy and the objectives of the National Industrial Policy Framework 
(NIPF).  
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